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SPITZBERGEN: JURISDICTIONAL FRICTION
OVER UNEXPLOITED OIL RESERVES
J. PETER A. BERNHARDT*
The Archipelago of Spitzbergen lies approximately 355 miles
to the north of the northernmost point of Norway, and is surrounded by the Arctic Ocean, the Greenland Sea, and the Barents Sea. It is subject to the vicissitudes of the Arctic polar ice
cap which retreats northward during a short summer season to
permit travel by steamer to the several settlements in the Archipelago.
Until 1920, the Archipelago had remained terra nullius. In
that year as a concomitant of the Versailles Peace Settlement discussions following the First World War, the Allies and other
States concluded a treaty: the Treaty on the Status of Spitzbergen signed at Paris on February 9, 1920.1 In this Treaty Norwegian sovereignty was recognized over Spitzbergen subject to
the reservation of certain rights, privileges, powers, and immunities inuring to the benefit of the signatories. Foremost among
these rights was the guarantee of access to the Archipelago
on a basis of absolute equality with Norway for the purpose of
carrying on maritime, industrial, mining, and commercial operations. 2 A further stipulation provided that Norway could
levy a one-percent duty on all minerals exported from the Archipelago.' Suffice it to say, neither the signatories nor Norway envisaged the discovery of commercially exploitable reserves of oil and natural gas under the shallow continental shelf
of Spitzbergen more than fifty years later.
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Counsel, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Law of the Sea Division, Washington, D.C. B.A., Dartmouth College; Certificate in International
Law, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law. Adviser, U.S. Delegation to U.N. Seabeds Delegation.
Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
All translations were provided by the author.
1. Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitzbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, 43
Stat. 1892, T.S. 686, 2 L.N.T.S. 8 [hereinafter cited as Spitzbergen Treaty].
The official English text of the treaty is reproduced in Appendix, infra.
2. Id., art. 3.
3. Id., art. 8.
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As a result of the latter phenomenon, it is not surprising
that much uncertainty arises if one attempts to resolve the rights
of the United States under the Treaty to explore for and to exploit oil and natural gas deposits on the Spitzbergen continental shelf, for the terms of the Treaty, now one half a century
old, were drawn one quarter of a century before the Truman
4
Proclamation was enunciated.
I.

THE TREATY ON THE STATUS OF SPITZBERGEN:

THE

ISSUES STATED

The Treaty is an unusual one in that, although the original signatories were fully independent and sovereign States (viz.,
Norway, on the one side, and the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and
Sweden on the other), the Archipelago of Spitzbergen, whose
sovereignty was the subject of conflicting claims at the time of
the Treaty, was not a sovereign territory of Norway nor of any
other country. It is the nature of this recognition of Norwegian
sovereignty over Spitzbergen which raises the question of Spitzbergen's juridical relationship vis-d-vis Norway and the original
parties. An examination of the language of the applicable
Treaty articles and identification of the principal problems of
interpretation presented in the Treaty is illustrative.
Article 1 defines the area in which the rights granted to the
High Contracting Parties shall be exercised, and over which Norwegian sovereignty shall be recognized. The parties to the Treaty
refer to themselves as the "High Contracting Parties." They see
themselves as entering into a contractual relationship, albeit the
contract is an international agreement among sovereign States.
This, then, implies that the law of contract as recognized by civilized nations as well as the public international law of peace is
applicable in any interpretation of the terms of the Treaty.
The High Contracting Parties agree to recognize the "full
and absolute sovereignty of Norway over Spitzbergen," subject
4. It is the belief of this author that the intent of the parties as expressed
by the language of an agreement, however old it may be, should be reconstructed
by a strict examination and interpretation of that language as used by the parties
at the time, and that that intent, once reconstructed, should govern the relationships established by the agreement in question. It is felt that any other more
liberal or contemporary method of interpretation is without factual foundation
or justification.
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only to the "stipulations of the present Treaty." 5 Nowhere in
article 1 do the words "territorial waters," "territorial seas," or
any reference to the waters surrounding the Archipelago of Spitzbergen appear. The High Contracting Parties fail to reserve
any rights to themselves or otherwise detract from the recognition of Norway's "full and absolute sovereignty" over Spitzbergen, save as reserved to themselves by the "stipulations of the
present Treaty." 6 It is also significant that the High Contracting
Parties do not grant sovereignty to Norway; rather they recognize her sovereignty over Spitzbergen. Regardless of the status
of the Archipelago of Spitzbergen as terra nullius before the 1920
Treaty, it would appear that however inchoate Norway's claim
to Spitzbergen might have been, the High Contracting Parties
regarded her claim to be superior to their own, and legally established what had earlier been the actual, if not recognized
status quo ante. Finally, note that article 1 lays emphasis on terrestial, not maritime areas.
As article 1 defines the area in which the rights enjoyed
by the High Contracting Parties shall be enjoyed (viz., articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10) and the areas in which the High
Contracting Parties agree to recognize Norwegian sovereignty, it
is significant that the Treaty does not mention territorial waters,
territorial seas, or maritime boundaries. The omission of such
language in article 1 may be interpreted in two ways.
First, the parties did not recognize Norwegian sovereignty
over the water around the Spitzbergen Archipelago, thus reserving to themselves as res communis omnium the water up to the
low water mark around "all islands great or small or rocks" appertaining thereto. Under this possibility, the Treaty itself would
not be the source of any rights of the High Contracting Parties to the
waters around Spitzbergen. The waters off Spitzbergen simply
would not be included in the area defined in article 1; rather, any
rights the parties would enjoy to the waters off Spitzbergen would
be based on prior claims or rights they had enjoyed. These
rights in the water, if any, would arise from Spitzbergen's status
before 1920 as terra nullius. As previously noted, since the High
Contracting Parties recognized Norway's sovereignty over Spitzbergen (and thereby her greater claim to Spitzbergen) such a
5. Spitzbergen Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1.
6. Id.
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theory of implied rights reserved by the High Contracting Parties appears unlikely.
A second possible interpretation would be that a recognition
by the High Contracting Parties of "full and absolute sovereignty" to Norway over Spitzbergen subject to the stipulations contained in the Treaty, would of necessity entail a recognition of
sovereignty over the territorial waters surrounding the Archipelago. That is, "the so-called territorial waters are as much a part of
By analogy, if the
the realm of the littoral State as its land."'
Treaty is in the nature of a quitclaim deed or contract, any
rights of the grantor not specifically reserved by him in the contract or conveyance vest in the grantee.8 However, since the High
Contracting Parties recognized Norwegian sovereignty, the territorial waters would be included in the area described by article 1.
Under the first possibility, the High Contracting Parties could
surrender no greater rights or powers to Norway than they themselves actually possessed on February 9, 1920. Secretary of State
Lansing stated with reference to Spitzbergen:
No nation ever considered it worth its while to occupy them
[the islands comprising Spitzbergen] or to assert sovereignty over them. . . . Thus the archipelago remained
unoccupied, and it became generally recognized that Spitzbergen was terra nullius, a 'no man's land.' Doubtless in
recent years more than one government would have been
willing to have annexed the territory in view of its possible
mineral wealth, but having so long acquiesced in the declaration that it was terra nullius none has had the hardihood to
claim sovereignty over the archipelago. 9
7.

1 M.

WHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 11 (1965).

8. The part or thing excepted, it is said, must be described with such
certainty that it may be identified, and an exception has not infrequently been held to be void for lack of such certainty.
4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 975 (3d ed. 1939).
In case of doubt, it is said, the conveyance is to be construed
most strongly as against the grantor, or in favor of the grantee....
Applying this rule, an exception or reservation in a conveyance is construed in favor of the grantee rather than of the grantor.
4 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 978 (3d ed. 1939).

A grantor in his deed is presumed to have made all the reservations he intended to make and he is not permitted to derogate from his
grant by showing that some reservation was intended, but not expressed.
Cutwright v. Richey, 208 Okla. 413, 257 P.2d 286 (1953).
9. Lansing, A Unique InternationalProblem, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 764
(1917). Hackworth states:
On July 9, 1914, the Secretary of State instructed the American
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As Spitzbergen was regarded as terra nullius by the High
Contracting Parties, they could not have reserved to themselves
any rights to the territorial waters of Spitzbergen for they had no
such rights to reserve. The logic, if any, of this train of thought
cannot be further extended without rendering meaningless the
High Contracting Parties' recognition of "full and absolute sovereignty" of Norway. The very existence of the Treaty of 1920 indicates that both sides believed that a valid quid pro quo had
transpired. However, given the failure to mention the territorial
sea in article 1, a meaningful query would be whether the High
Contracting Parties specifically intended article 1 to be limited to
the Spitzbergen islands and not the seas.
With regard to this construction of article 1, any recognition
by the High Contracting Parties of full and absolute sovereignty
of Norway includes, as its correlative, sovereignty over the territorial sea. In 1920 sovereignty was limited to one marine league
(four nautical miles) for all Scandinavian countries. Such a construction is complicated in that article 1 serves two purposes.
First, article 1 provides an express limitation of territory in which
the rights of the High Contracting Parties established in articles
2-10 of the Treaty operate. Second, article 1 describes the extent
of territory over which the High Contracting Parties agree to recognize Norwegian sovereignty. Imprecise drafting leaves this
duality unresolved and necessitates resort to the travaux prparatoires.
Perhaps the most important language contained in article 1
is that which sets forth the comprehensive delimitations of the Archipelago. In no other article of the Treaty do the High Contracting Parties recognize Norway's sovereignty over any additional
areas, nor are any further rights bestowed. The limits of the area
defined are 100 and 350 longitude East of Greenwich and 740
and 810 latitude North. Read with the provisions of article 3," °
this delimitation fails to include the continental shelf."
delegates to make it clear to the representatives at the Conference that
the United States did not desire any part in the control of the government to be organized in Spitzbergen or to assume any responsibility
therefor.
1 M. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATAONAL Lw 466 (1940).
10. See Spitzbergen Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3 and Appendix, infra.
11. By this unequivocal method, the author concludes that not only did
the High Contracting Parties not intend to include the continental shelf within
the prepositional phrases "both on land and in the territorial waters" in article
3, but, even if they did so intend, they would be estopped from so assert-
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Article 3,12 while raising questions, also appears to answer
one. The immediate question of whether "the territories specified
in Article 1" include the territorial sea appears resolved, at least
so far as to "maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises" for paragraph two of article 3 includes in the long
phrase, defining the above enterprise, the words "both on land and
in the territorial waters."13
ing. It is evident that no continental shelf will ever take the form of a square
or any other geometric form, at the 200 meter isobath or at any other. The
High Contracting Parties, in signing the Treaty, indicated in article 1 that they
envisaged mineral rights reservations on the islands of the Spitzbergen Archipelago with access and admittance rights within the territorial waters, and not any
contemplated rights to minerals on the continental shelf beyond the territorial
sea. This delimitation indicates that the reservation for mining or commercial enterprises "both on land and in the territorial waters" contained in article
3 does not include the continental shelf in that definition.
The continental shelf is most conservatively (and perhaps in this particular
instance most liberally) construed to mean:
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area; (b) to the
seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts
of the co-ordinates of islands.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done, Apr. 29, 1958, - Stat. -, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312, art. 1 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention]. Boxing the compass around the Archipelago with reference to article
1 and the 200 meter isobath gives most interesting results. To the north at
1240 00' .00"E, the 200 meter isobath lies thirty-seven miles to the north of 810
00 .00"N; to the east, along 79* 00' .00"N, the 200 meter isobath lies 137
miles to the east of L35" 00' .00"E; to the south, along L19 ° 00' .00"E, the
200 meter isobath lies eight miles to the south of 74* 00' .00"N; to the west, on
79* 22' .00"N, the 200 meter isobath lies eighteen miles west of L 16" 00' .00"E.
12. See Spitzbergen Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3 and Appendix, infra.
13. Id. This apparently facilie resolution of the question is complicated
when article 3 is examined in its entirety. Doubtless it is the governing article
of the Treaty regarding mining and commercial enterprises. It is curious that,
while the High Contracting Parties clearly incorporated the prepositional phrase
in the first paragraph of article two (the first paragraph of the article being
the natural place for the establishment of any territorial regime in which the
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities granted in the article are to operate),
they did see fit to incorporate it in the first paragraph of article 3. This omission was not due to the failure of the first paragraph of article 3 to establish
such a territorial regime; rather, the first paragraph of article 3 states:
The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the
observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality.
Thus article 1 is referred to in the paragraph, but with the inclusion of "waters,
fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1.... ." As article 1
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Article 6 is of marginal interest since it governs rights acquired by nationals of the High Contracting Parties prior to February 9, 1920. It states:
makes no mention of waters, fjords, or ports, such an inclusion here indicates
that in a grammatical analysis of the series of prepositional phrases in the first
paragraph of article 3 the phrase "to the waters, fjords and ports" is governed
by the words immediately preceding the phrase, i.e., "equal liberty of access and
entry for any reason or object whatever," whereas "of the territories specified"
refers to the final prepositional phrase "in Article ." Any other interpretation,
e.g., reading "to the waters, fjords and ports" to refer forward spatially to "of
the territories specified in Article 1" would render nugatory the description of
territory defined in article 1. As Judge De Visscher stated in the Advisory Opinion in the International Status of Southwest Africa:
It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty claims
must not only be considered as a whole, but must also be interpreted
so as to avoid as much as possible depriving one of them of practical
effect for the benefit of others.
International Status of Southwest Africa Case, [1950] I.C.J. 128.
In similar vein, and given that the emphasis of the first half of the compound sentence in the first paragraph of article 3 is on "access and entry," the
adverb "there" in the second half of the compound sentence refers back to
its nearest (physical) antecedent, i.e., the "territories specified in Article 1."
Therefore the "territories specified in Article 1" are those included in the regime
in which the High Contracting Parties "may carry on there without impediment
all maritime, industrial, mining, and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality."
The second paragraph of article 3 does. seem to resolve the problems
evinced in article 1 and the first paragraph of article 3, but, in order to fulfill
Judge De Visscher's ruling on complementary provisions, it must be interpreted
as a specific provision enlarging for the purposes of paragraph two of article
3 only the area specified in article 1. Whereas the High Contracting Parties
referred to "waters, fjords and ports" in paragraph one of article 3, in paragraph
two of the same article they refer to "on land and in the territorial waters."
Moreover, where the High Contracting Parties refer to "maritime, industrial,
mining and commercial operations" (emphasis added) in paragraph one, they
refer to the "exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises" in paragraph two. While the lack of parallelism in the same
article renders it ambiguous, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between
the words "operation" and "enterprise" save that "enterprise" does seem to encompass a greater and more "aggressive" number and type of activities.
Were it not for the French text, the words "exercise and practice" would
admit of some difficulty of interpretation. However, the French alternat provides that "[i]ls [the High Contracting Parties] seront admis dans les m~mes
conditions d'6galit6 h l'exercise et
l'exploitation de toutes entreprises maritimes
. . ." and resolves the doubt as to the meaning of "practice" in the English
text.
Without resorting to the travaux pr~paratoiresor subsequent practice of the
High Contracting Parties to determine what areas are included in the mining
and commercial stipulation of the Treaty, it is concluded that from a pure linguistic interpretation of the Treaty in vacuo, the territorial sea is included in
the territories specified in article 1 insofar as they pertain to maritime, industrial,
mining, and commercial operations.
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Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired
rights of nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall be
recognized.
Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation of
land before the signature of the present Treaty shall be dealt
with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have
14
the same force and effect as the present Treaty.
The claims envisaged in article 6 are those "arising from taking
possession or from occupation of land." Further, as such claims
were to be dealt with according to the Annex to the Treaty,'" it
should be noted that paragraph 1 (9) of the Annex refers to the
Claims Commissioner granting title to "the land in question in
accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1 of the present
treaty." The identical language reappears following article 2(11)
of the Annex. The Annex in article 1(9) refers to article 8 of the
Treaty where applicability is governed by the "terms specified in
Article 1" language.
Article 716 does little more than reiterate the guarantee
of absolute equality in mining and commercial operations (in
"Article 1" territory) received by the High Contracting Parties
in the first paragraph of article 3. It does, however, enlarge the
"mining operations" rights in the first paragraph of article 3 in that
"mineral rights" are granted to the High Contracting Parties by
Norway.
Article 817 is an important article in that it provides both for
the establishment of mining regulations "[T]o provide for the
territories specified in Article 1," and for that which is of greatest
interest to United States corporations-Norway's "[Rlight to
levy an export duty in minerals which shall not exceed 1% of the
maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100,000
tons .

.

.

."

The area in which this export duty is to be effec-

tive is defined in the previous paragraph which states that
"taxes, dues and duties levied shall not exceed what is required
for the object in view." The "said territories" refers back to the
initial paragraph which provides "[F]or the territories specified in
Article 1." Thus, by a narrow construction of article 8, even
14. See Spitzbergen Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6 and Appendix, infra.
15. Id., Annex.

16. Id., art. 7.
17. Id., art. 8.
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though the High Contracting Parties under article 3 enjoy rights
to mining operations in the territorial waters, they would not
necessarily enjoy the low export duty on minerals provided in article 8. Moreover, minerals which might be extracted from the
territorial sea under article 3 could not possibly fall under the
mining regulations contemplated in article 8.18
A final point of interest embodied in article 8 is that the
nature of minerals as viewed by the High Contracting Parties is
revealed. The export duty on minerals "[S]hall not exceed 1%
of the maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100,000
tons."19 It is interesting to note cubic or barrel measures were
the measures applicable to natural gas and oil well before the signing of the Treaty.
II.

THE MINING REGULATIONS FOR SPITZBERGEN: A
HINDERANCE TO INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 3

Given the issues raised by article 8, it is now appropriate to
examine the Mining Regulations for Spitzbergen of August 7,
1925.20
Article 1 of The Mining Regulations states that it shall apply
to an area whose description is exactly that as stated in article 1
of the Treaty, except that "the Archipelago of Spitzbergen" as
stated in article 1 of the Treaty becomes the."entire Archipelago
of Spitzbergen"' 1 in article 1 of the Mining Code.
Article 2 specifically enlarges the scope of the word "minerals" used in the Treaty:
The right of searching for and acquiring and exploiting
natural deposits of coal, mineral oils and other minerals and
rocks which are the object of mining and quarrying .... 22
The question of whether "mineral oils" includes oil and natural
gas is left to a later discussion; suffice it here to point out that
the term "mineral oils" in the Treaty falls between the words
"coal" and "other minerals and rocks which are the object of
mining or quarrying," and that in the remaining articles of the
18. That is, the Mining Regulations for Spitzbergen of August 7, 1925.
19. See Spitzbergen Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8 and Appendix, infra [emphasis added].
20. The Mining Code (Mining Regulations) for Spitzbergen, Norwegian
Royal Decree, August 7, 1925, [hereinafter cited as Mining Code].
21. Id., art. 1 [emphasis added].
22. Id., art. 2.
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Regulations the term "mineral oils" is not again used, rather
"minerals or rocks mentioned in Article 2."
Article 7 (1) states:
The search for natural deposits of the minerals and rocks
mentioned in Article 2 may be made on one's own property
as well as on that of any other party, and on the State
land.

23

The pronoun "that" is understood to relate back to "property,"
and the nature of both terms is clarified by the final prepositional
phrase in series, "and on the State land."
Article 9(1)24 charges the discoverer with making his
claim "by marks in solid rock or, by other lasting and satisfactory
means." The discoverer must further "visibly locate a discovery
point." Under article 9(2) (d) the discovery notice required shall
contain "information of the nature of the discovery under reference
to a sample handed over at the same time, of the minerals or rocks
found."2
Under article 12(2) (c) in which boundary claims are discovered, the Regulations provide that "[d]ispensations from the rectangular form should be given by request of the applicant, when
this is dictated by configuration of the coast line or other natural
boundaries. '"26

Articles 19 et. seq. concern the "relation of the proprietor to
the ground."27
Article 20 (1) provides:
A claim-holder has the right to demand the assignment by
the Commissioner of Mines of the ground needed for footpaths, roads, railways, tramways, aerial ropeways, dumps,
surface buildings, stores, quays, and 28other establishments
connected with the working of the mines.

It may be inferred that roads, railways, and aerial ropeways would,
at least in Spitzbergen, be concerned primarily with the movement of minerals from the mines to the seacoast so that the minerals could be shipped abroad. If maritime claims were within the
contemplation of the parties when the Mining Regulations were
drawn up, it would not have been necessary to include such a
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
id.,
Id.,

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

7(1).
9(l).
9(d).
12(c) (emphasis added).
19 (emphasis added).
20(1).
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provision for offshore mines, as shipping was available in situ. Of
course, it might be argued that this provision was not intended to
be a catholic one applicable to all mining, but limited in its scope
to terrestrial based activities.
Article 34(1) states in part that:
Persons and companies who make territorial claims on
the basis of acts of appropriation or occupations that have
taken place before the signing of the Treaty relating to Spitzbergen ....

29

While the validity of the principle inclusio [expressio] unius est
exclusio alterius might be in question in these Regulations, research of the history of Spitzbergen has made it clear that at the
time of the treaty (9 February 1920) there had been no claim
made to Spitzbergen's maritime areas by any of the nationals of
the High Contracting Parties. This does not necessarily exclude
the possibility of valid non-territorial claims being made after
February 9, 1920; it merely points out the evidence of the adjective "territorial."

1I.

THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES:

AN ANSWER TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED BY ARTICLES 1 AND 3 OF THE TREATY

After a complete review of the travaux pr~paratoires° of the
1920 Treaty on the Status of Spitzbergen, the only issue raised
29. Id. art. 34(1).
30. No rule of international law would seem more firmly established
than this rule of the interpretation of treaties in the light of the intent
of the negotiators. That intent, naturally, is assumed to be stated in
the text of the treaty itself, but it also may be sought elsewhere, either
in specific reservations attached to treaties at the time of signature or
ratification, or in interpretations, clarifications, understandings, constructions, qualifications or actual conditions set forth during the negotiations prior to the ratification. Hence it is to be expected that in
any future divergence of opinions concerning the nature of the obligations assumed under the General Pact for the Renunciation of War recourse must necessarily be had, not only to the official correspondence
of the negotiations, but to various offical utterances of such government spokesmen as Sir Austen Chamberlain, M. Briand, Secretary Kellogg, and Senator Borah. Their interpretation of this instrument will be
entitled to the, closest scrutiny and respect.
Brown, The Interpretation of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War,
23 AM. J. INT'L L. 274, 277-78 (1924).
When there is doubt as to the meaning of a treaty provision it is appropriate to look to the purpose and meaning of the instrument as a
whole and to inquire into the intention of the parties as indicated both
at the time of and subsequent to the negotiations. For this purpose resort may be had to communications exchanged and statements made
by the parties during the course of the negotiations and at the time of
signature.
5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (1943).
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earlier which can now be resolved on the basis of the Treaty and
the travaux preparatoires is the nature of Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen as recognized by the High Contracting Parties, and particularly by the United States, in article 1 of the
Treaty. Nothing regarding the nature of minerals as contemplated
by the parties was mentioned.
As a quid pro quo of the Monroe Doctrine, it had been the
constant attitude of United States foreign policy makers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries not to become involved
in European affairs. This attitude has considerable bearing upon
the stance taken by the United States during the Spitzbergen question.
The only significant United States company which had interest in Spitzbergen was the Arctic Coal Company, established by
Messrs. Frederick Ayer and John M. Longyear, American nationals who first became interested in Spitzbergen coal deposits
in 1904. In a letter from Ayre to Secretary of State Hay dated
February 20, 1904, the Secretary for the Department stated: "[i]t
is this Department's understanding that the Spitzbergen Islands
'3 1
are claimed by Russia."
Ayer and Longyear, acting on this information, requested
permission from the Imperial Russian Government to explore for
and to exploit minerals in Spitzbergen, and received a reply from
the Russian Foreign Office to the effect that, as Russia did not
claim the islands, they were regarded as terra nullius and as such
open to all nations to explore and to exploit at their leisure. Ayer
and Longyear therefore claimed certain tracts in Spitzbergen during the summer season of 1905. The proprietors incorporated
the business on February 9, 1906 as the Arctic Coal Company, a
West Virginia corporation. 32 The next ten years was typified by
much correspondence between the Company and the Secretary
of State, and from the interests of this sole company arose the
"interests" of the United States in Spitzbergen. The Company was
sold in 1916 to a Swedish company. At the time of the Versailles
Conference in 1919, under whose auspices the Spitzbergen question was resolved, the United States had no actual remaining
claims in the Archipelago.
Secretary of State Lansing, in a provocative article,3 3 examined
31. 5 G.

HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

223 (1943).

32. Id.
33. Lansing, A Unique International Problem, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 763

(1917).
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the question which was the subject of several international conferences. The tenor of these conferences was one that envisaged
the establishment of an international body (in a sense a prototype
of the League mandate system, but without any single sovereign
state in control of the mandate) to govern Spitzbergen which
would continue to "enjoy" its status as terra nullius. The last conference, in June, 1914, was terminated by Sarajevo and its aftermath, and first reconvened at Paris following the First World War.
The Spitzbergen Commission was established to handle the question. While not determinative of the legal force of the Treaty itself,
Mr. Nielsen (the representative from the United States) reiterated
the opinion that Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen should be
made absolute. This is a clear index of this country's ambivalent
position on Spitzbergen at that time.
Explicit in Nielsen's comments3 4 is clearly a disavowal of
34. On July 23, 1919, Nielsen said:
Norway wants it [Spitzbergen], and it was Mr. Lansing's view that
to concede sovereignty to Norway would be a good disposal. . . . All
the delegates seem to favor this idea of conceding sovereignty to Norway.
Mr. White: There is no doubt that we [our plenipotentiaries] favor it.
Mr. Nielsen: I think, Mr. White, we could insist that the treaty be so
framed that it is merely a recognition on the part of the five powers of
the sovereignty, so we would say that as far as we are concerned we,
recognize the sovereignty.
U.S. Archives: American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Paris 1918-19) Case
184.00101/121 (emphasis added).
A telegram that went out from the United States' Ambassador to France
to the Secretary of State on July 26, 1919 is more indicative:
In view previous participation our government in solution Spitzbergen
And since our recognition of Norwegian sovereignty must pre-Q.
sumably be given in some other way if we do not sign prepared treaty,
and since we incur no obligation apart from recognition Norwegian
sovereignty, all other obligations being on part Norway, it is suggested
our participation as signatory must be desirable.
Id.
At the same time there was a feeling of gratitude for the part Norway
played for the Allied cause during the War. Sir Esme Howard, President of
the Commission on Baltic Affairs, stated:
La meilleure solution serait de donner un mandat h la Norv~ge. Donner
ce mandat A la Norv~ge serait reconnaltre les tres grands services rendus
par elle i l'entente pendant la guerre. L'Angleterre a d'importants
intr~ts miniers au Spitzberg. Ceux-ci devaient 6tre sauvegard~s.
U.S. Archives: American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Paris 1918-19) Case
181.5101/18 (Proc~s Verbal No. 14, Seance du 7. VII. 19) (emphasis added).
At the commencement of the Spitzberg Commission [and all future quotes
are from 181.5101, numbers referring to the sessions], Nielsen noted the disinterest of the U.S. in the question [by the rapporteur]:
Mr. Nielsen pense qu'en raison de l'int~r& qu'ils ont eu dans la question, les Etats-Unis seraient signatories au Trait6, bien que le Spitzberg
ne les int~resse plus, ni au point de vue politique ni au m~me au point

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 [], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

any "rights" the United States might have enjoyed in Spitzbergen
prior to 1920. Rights which, as seen in the historical mis en
scone, were at best sketchy. It would be impossible to argue that
the Treaty was a quid pro quo or a quitclaim, in which the United
States impliedly reserved any rights not specified in the Treaty."5
There remains one other aspect of the sovereignty question
raised in the travaux prdparatoireswhich must be explained.
The original preamble to the Treaty stated:
D~sireux, en reconnaissant ddfinitivement la souverainet6 de
la Norv~ge sur l'archipel du Spitzberg .... 36
The final text, however, omits the adjective "d6finitivede vue industriel---ceci dit sous reserve d'instructions h recevoir de
Washington.
Id. (Procs-Verbal No. 3 du 24. VII. 19).
During the rest of the meetings, Nielsen, presumably now under instruction
since the rapporteur noted no reservations as to further instructions from Washington, pushed for absolute Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen.
On July 25:
"M. Marcretti Ferrante (Italie):
L'expression 'pleine et enti~re souverainetW' ne me parait pas exacte
car la souverainet6 de la Norv~ge est limit6e par l'article 4.
Le President:
On pourrait ajouter 'aux conditions ci-apris' mais cette formule
avait quelque chose de blessant pour la Norv~ge, qui prend d'ellemime les engagements que nous-d~sirons.
Mr. Marcretti Ferrante:
C'est vraiment un cas tout fait nouveau que celui d'une le donn~e
sous certaines conditions. Souveraine de l'Archipel, la Norv~ge serait
libre en cas de guerre, de saisir les biens de ses ennemis.
Mr. Nielsen:
I1 y a evidemment des droits priv~s h garantir, mais cette garantie
n'emp~che pas que la Norv~ge ait pleine et enti~re souverainet6 au point
de vue d'etat.
On 1 August, 1919, Nielsen objected to the President's desire that the language terra nullius continued to be employed.
Le President insiste sur ce fait qu'il s'agit d'une terra nullius.
M. Nielsen (Etats-Unis d'Am6rique) objecte que la clause pesera sur
la Norv~ge quand le Spitsberg aura cess6 d'etre terra nullius.
On 6 August, 1919, Nielsen again said in similar view:
Estime que la souverainet6 de la Norv~ge 6tant admise, la reconnaissance de tous les droits doit 8tre faite conformiment A la loi qui
sera promulgu6e par la Norv~ge, sauf en ce qui concerne les droits
privilgi~s acquis devant la signature du trait6.
On 19 August, 1919, Nielsen again said:
Je propose de faire une distinction entre le traitement des nations les
plus favoris6es et le traitment national, et cela pendant une p6riode
d6termin6e, par exemple pendant la p~riode qui sera n6cessaire h
l'6tablissement des personnes qui iront se fixer dans ces les. On
adopterait ensuite un r6gime de libert6. De cette maninre on ne courait
pas le risque de paraitre imposer des limites & la souverainet6 de la
Norv~ge.
35. Such as, the waters surrounding Norway.
36. Desirous, while recognizing definitely Norwegian sovereignty over the
Archipelago of Spitzbergen . . . (emphasis added).
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ment." While this initially lends credence to the argument that
something less than "full and absolute sovereignty" was recognized in Norway, the reason for its omission appears to be a historical one.
Sweden had been a lukewarm contender for sovereignty
over Spitzbergen. On 23 August, 1919, Count Ehrensvard, representative of Sweden, asked for the deletion of the adjective:
D'autre part, il demande [the Count] la suppression, dans
la pr6ambule, du mot d6finitivement dans la phrase suivante:
(Les Puissances) . . se d6clarent d6sireuses de reconnfitre ddfinitivement la souverainet6 de la Norv~ge ....
Ce mot laisse supporter que la thrse norv6gienne d'apr~s laquelle Louis XIV et le roi Charles XI de Suede ont reconnu la
souverainet6 danoise, dont les Norv6giens sont les h6ritiers au
37
Spitzberg, est admise.
On 26 August, 1919, the Commission responded favorably
on this basis: "[ill est ddcid6 comme la demand6 le Ministre
de Suede, que le mot dtfinitivement ne figurera plus dans la
prdambule du Trait6. '' 35 Therefore, for reasons purely historical,
the adjective "d6finitivement" was removed from the preamble,
and done moreover at the instigation of one not even on the
Spitzbergen Commission. It is evident that the United States
played no role in its deletion.
While the travaux prdparatoires, as expected, were of no
assistance in determining the status of the waters beyond the territorial sea of Norway other than in establishing a superior Norwegian claim to them over any second power. Due to the absolute
nature of Norwegian sovereignty just discussed, a change made in
article 3 is pertinent.
Originally, article
tracting Parties] seront
lit6, A l'exercise et A
times, industrielles, ou

3 provided that "[i]ls [the High Conadmis dans les m~mes conditions d' gal'exploitation de toutes entreprises maricommerciales, tant t terre que dans les

37. Id. (Proc6s-Verbal No. 13 du 23. VIII. 19).
Moreover, he [the Court] wishes to delete the word "definitely" in the
preamble, to wit: (The Powers)
the sovereignty of Norway ....

... wish to recognize definitely
The inclusion of this word would

be an admission of the validity of the Norwegian theory, i.e., that
Louis XIV and King Charles XI of Sweden recognized Danish sovereignty over Spitzbergen, to which sovereignty Norway later succeeded.
38. Id. (Proc6s-Verbal No. 13 du 23. VIII. 19).
[i]t is decided, as requested by the Swedish Minister, that the word
"definitely" shall no longer appear in the preamble.
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eaux adjacentes."'39 In Annex II to Meeting 9, held 6 August, 1919,
the Norwegian delegation, inter alia, requested that "eaux adjacentes au dernier alin6a 6 tre remplac6es par eaux territoriales."4
There are several viewpoints which, while not definitive, help to resolve this change.
First, and linguistically speaking, "eaux adjacent" has no
precise legal significance as does the terminology "territorial waters." Generally speaking, the term "adjacent waters" conveys a
more restrictive meaning than "territorial waters," and connotes
waters contiguous to the coastline of a State. Webster's defines
the adjective as "lying near, close, contiguous; neighboring, bordering etc."'" As only the high seas are seaward of the territorial sea, and as "high seas" can be thought of only in the most
expansive connotation when dealing with international seas and
oceans (there being nothing greater), it is hard to conceive
"adjacent waters" being more expansive in meaning than the
term "territorial seas."
Second, it would be illogical to assume, even arguendo,
that Norway would prepare a modification in the terms of the
treaty inimical to her own interests, especially given the protracted
period during which she had claimed sovereignty over Norway.
It reasonably follows that the requested modification was to make
her sovereignty as complete as possible. Although mentioned only
in article 3, apparently Norway wished the more catholic language not in order to grant to the High Contracting Parties
rights greater than they had previously enjoyed to maritime, industrial, mining, and commercial enterprises, but rather to restrict their activities in the territorial waters subject to her sovereignty in Spitzbergen. This assured Norway that she would have
the powers to enforce the Mining Regulations and subject the
nationals of the High Contracting Parties to these Regulations.4 2
The silence of the other High Contracting Parties in preparing
the modification is a strong indication that the qualification ("in
39. Id. (Procis-Verbal No. 3 du 24. VII. 19).

[t]hey [the High Contracting Parties] shall be admitted under the same
conditions of quality to the exercise and exploitation of all maritime,
industrial, or commercial undertakings, on land as well as in the adjajent waters (emphasis added).
40. Id. (Proc s-Verbal No. 8 du 6. VIII. 19).
adjacent waters in the last indented line be replaced by territorial waters.
41. WEasTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 32 (2d ed. 1951).
42. She perhaps had in mind the "rum-running" and hovering problems at-

tendant on the ratification of the eighteenth amendment in 1919.
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the territorial waters") has reference more to the Mining Regulations to be established by Norway, and the rights of access and
entry discussed in the head paragraph of article 3, than to any
mining rights incidentally acquired by Norway's fortuitous (and
doubtless from her viewpoint unfortunate) observation on article 3 on August 11, 1919.11
Parenthetically, the judgment of the International Court
of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases substantiates
the view that Norway, as a sovereign State, enjoyed an inherent
right to the soil and subsoil of the waters beyond the territorial
sea:
The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of
continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of
its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as
an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
44
resources. In short it is an inherent right.
The travaux pr6paratoires also did not elaborate upon the
nature of the term "minerals" as used by the High Contracting
Parties. Although the original draft of article 3 provides "[i]ls
[the High Contracting Parties] seront admis dans les m~mes
conditions d'6galit6, h l'exercise et t l'exploitation de toutes enterprises maritimes, industrielles, ou commerciales, tant h terre
que dans les eaux adjacentes," 4I and the final, besides changing
"adjacentes" to "territoriales" as discussed earlier, added "mini6res" apparently "sur la proposition de la D616gation anglaise,
la Commission d6cide de pr6ciser le texte en ajoutant, apr6s le
mot 'industrielles,' le mot 'mini~res.' ",46 No reasoned conclu43. Finally, as the other changes contained in Norway's Annex II of August 11, 1919 redound to her benefit, and as the Annex ends with "[e]n g6n6ral, le Gouvernement Norv6gien, qui d6sire maintenir l'ordre dans l'archipel,
suppose que les dispositions du projet n'excluent pas la facult6 de faire extrader des criminels du Spitsberg, d'y exercer le droit d'expulsion et d'y mettre
en vigueur des pr6scriptions en vue d'emp~cher la formation de trusts." The
above deductions thus seem more valid than not.
44. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 22.
45. They [the High Contracting Parties] shall be admitted under the
same conditions of equality, to both the exercise and exploitation of all
maritime, industrial, or commercial undertakings, both on land and in
the territorial waters.
46. The final, besides changing "adjacent" to "territorial" as discussed earlier, added "mineral" apparently
on the proposition of the English Delegation, the Commission has decided to clarify the text by adding the adjective "mineral" after the adjective "industrial."
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sion can be made on the nature of the minerals in question, other
than the High Contracting Parties' wish to specify that such minerals were to be included in the rights secured in article 3. As
the addition of "minires" was subsequent to the change to "eaux
territoriales," its addition must be considered independent of the
latter change.
The travaux prparatoiresdo not satisfactorily resolve the
question whether oil and natural gas are included among the mineral rights secured to the High Contracting Parties in the 1920
Treaty. Although the United States is primarily interested in oil
and natural gas on the continental shelf of Spitzbergen, and although from the travaux pr~paratoiresit was probably not the inintention of the High Contracting Parties to acquire mineral
rights in the territorial waters (let alone in the continental shelf
beyond), the enquiry is important and necessary if the High
Contracting Parties do enjoy mineral rights in the territorial sea
and continental shelf. Since the language of the Treaty itself or
the travaux pr6paratoiressheds little light on this subject, reference must be made to definitions of the normal meaning of "minerals."4
A Department of State Study,4" prepared by L. H. Gray in
1919 for the State Department, gives an excellent view of the
49
position taken on Spitzbergen by the Department.
Although remarks made in the official study of Spitzbergen
47. For "It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be
interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their context, unless
such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd." Advisory
Opinion on Polish Postal Service in Danzig, [1925] P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 11, at
39-40.
48.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPITZBERGEN AND BEAR ISLAND (1919).

49. The Study, in examining the mineral resources of the Archipelago,

states that:
The economic importance of Spitzbergen . . . and its international importance, for the most part-lies solely in its mineral wealth (especially coal) and in its whaling, fishing, and hunting; ....
Id., at 11.

In the detailed examination of the mineral situation as it then existed, the
Study made but one reference to oil:

Oil-bearing rocks occur in the claims of the "Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate," but have not yet been thoroughly investigated.
Id., at 16.

The Study, in the conclusion of the chapter related to economic resources,
states:

Whatever value the island possesses, therefore, lies in its coal depos-

its; and even here the outlook is one of hope rather than of certainty.
Id., at 58.
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are rather convincing proof that the United States did not understand the term "minerals" to include oil and natural gas, additional views of the term "minerals" contemporary to the period
will be examined.
While it is true that the views of English and American authorities are not in themselves conclusive of the meaning of
"minerals" in an international agreement, they are relevant in
that they give some indication of what the two most highly industrialized States among the High Contracting Parties believed
"minerals" to include. The third edition of Lindley on Mines
gives an excellent period appraisal of that meaning. 0 However,
50.
as

1 C.

LINDLEY, LINDLEY ON

MINES 139 (3d ed. 1914) [hereinafter cited

LINDLEY].

The English view, as represented by Bainbridge, was (1900):
The word 'minerals' in its widest acceptation comprises every inorganic substance forming part of the crust or solid body of the earth
other than the layer of soil which sustains vegetable life and other than
the subsoil; and the minerals may be surface minerals (such as gravel
and clay) or minerals buried more or less deep in subsoil. Also,
minerals are not the less minerals because they are gotten by quarrying as
distinguished from mining.
Id., at 138-39.
In Hext v. Gill, LR. 7 Ch. App. 699 "mhe House of Lords announced
the rule that a reservation of 'minerals' includes every substance which can be
obtained from underneath the surface of the earth for the purpose of profit.
Id., at 139.
Lindley discusses a factual situation similar in certain aspects to that of
Spitzbergen:
The legislature of Pennsylvania had passed an act providing,
among other things, for the mortgaging of a 'leasehold of any colliery,
mining land, manufacturing, or other premises.' In passing upon the
act, the court held that petroleum was a mineral substance obtained
from the earth by a process of mining, and lands from which it is obtained may, with propriety, be called mining lands, therefore, the act
applied to and authorized a mortgage of a leasehold of oil land, although the Act was passed before petroleum was discovered ....
Id., at 151-52.
The same court, in a still later case, holds that natural gas is a
mineral, although it possesses peculiar attributes, which require the application of precedent arising out of ordinary mineral rights with much
more careful consideration, and terms it a mineral ferae naturae. That
it is classified as a mineral there is no doubt.
Id., at 152.
After examining other conflicting decisions, Lindley summarizes state court
practice and concludes:
While, owing to the circumstances surrounding a particular transaction, and the intention of the parties taken in connection with the
context, petroleum may at times be held not to have been comprehended in the term 'mineral' as used in a reservation clause of a conveyance, the decisions of the American courts are practically uniform
in holding that petroleum is a mineral. In construing private conveyances it is apparent that each case must be decided upon the language
of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the intention of the grantor, if it can be ascertained.
Id., at 153.
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in listing the substances classified as minerals by the English
courts, Lindley fails to mention oil or natural gas, regardless of
the apparent emphasis placed by the English courts on "profitable undertakings." 51 Nevertheless, he does state that "[i]n this
enumeration it is hardly necessary to mention gold, silver, the
common metals, or coal, as they fall within the earlier definition
of the term, and were usually obtained through underground excavations."5 2 The earlier definition of mineral to which he refers is:
[A] fossil, or what is dug out of the earth, and which is
predominantly metalliferous in character.
In this view, it will embrace as well bare granite of the
high mountains as the deepest hidden diamonds and metal53
lic ores.
Thus, at the time of the First World War, it is unclear whether oil
and natural gas were considered minerals by the English authorities.
Turning to the relevant American thought on the subject,
the consensus endorsed oil and natural gas to be minerals, although there was a dissenting view. As early as Funk v. Haldeman,5 4 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania treated petroleum
oil as a mineral, stating that "until our scientific knowledge on
the subject is increased, that is the light in which the courts will
be likely to regard this valuable production of the earth." 5
However, the same court two decades later, in Dunham v.
Kirkpatrick,56 in construing a deed containing a reservation of
"all minerals," held that "while it was true that petroleum was
a mineral, yet in popular estimation it was not so regarded; and
following the rule of construction invoked in Gibson v. Tyson,
the court concluded, that in contemplation of the parties to the
instrument petroleum was not within the reservation."5 7
Since 1897, there has been little doubt on the federal level
that petroleum is a mineral. "Under an act of Congress, passed
February 11, 1897, petroleum is declared to be a mineral
within the meaning of the federal mining laws, setting at rest a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id., at 144-48.
Id., at 145 (emphasis added).
Id., at 137.
53 Pa. 224, 248 (1866).
LINDLEY, supra note 50, at 150.
101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882).
LINDLEY, supra note 50, at 151 (emphasis added).
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possible doubt on this question raised by a decision of the then
Secretary of the Interior, Hoke Smith, who ruled that lands containing petroleum were not mineral lands within the meaning of
these laws.""8
IV.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE SPITZBERGEN MINING
REGULATIONS

Article 9(2)(d) is one of a series of provisions establishing
the requirements necessary to acquire a search license from the
Commissioner of Mines for Svalbard to explore for and to
exploit minerals.5 9 This seemingly innocuous article is an extremely significant one in the determination of the nature of
minerals. It could have provided an effective means by which Norway could have delayed, if not prevented, exploitation of oil and
natural gas within as well as outside the territorial sea of Spitzbergen. Yet Norway's action estopped her from any legal rights
inuring to her from a strict interpretation of article 9(2) (d).
It is clear that it is impossible to "hand over" a "sample,"
within the meaning of article 9(2)(d), of either oil or natural
gas before acquiring a search license. Prospecting a claim for oil
and natural gas requires considerable expenditure of both time and
equipment before a sample of either can be procured. Seen in this
light, the term "minerals" as used in the Treaty and in the Mining Regulations could not encompass either oil or natural gas. It
should be noted that no protests or queries were lodged in this
regard by any of the High Contracting Parties at the time the
Mining Regulations were enacted. The only inclusion of the term
"mineral oils" which appears either in the Treaty or in the Mining Regulations appears in article 2(1) of the Mining Regulations. This term can only mean oil extracted from other minerals;
oil from oilbearing slate, not oil in its natural state. The materials from the Archives reveal that there was interest in slate-bearing oil, and tests were made in Germany before the First War
indicating that the oil content of the slate in question was higher
than "normally" found in slate strata.60
58. Id., at 154.
59. It provided that "[information of the nature of the discovery under

reference to a sample, handed over at the same time, of the minerals or rocks
found is required before a search license is granted."
supra, art. 9(2)(d).
60. U.S. Archives; Spitzbergen Case 857H.6362.1.
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The question still unanswered is: from what authority did
the companies presently exploring for oil receive their search
licenses? Was the license granted pursuant to the terms of the
Mining Regulations? If done under the authority of the Mining
Regulations, Norway is estopped from claiming on the basis of
article 9(2)(d) in that petroleum oil and natural gas do not come
within the minerals mentioned in article 2(1) of the Regulations.
If, however, Norway proceeded to grant rights to oil and natural
gas outside the terms of the Mining Regulations, she can rely
on article 9(2)(d) and maintain the exclusion of oil and natural
gas from the 1925 regime."'
It is commonly accepted that an oral declaration by a responsible official of the Government of a State acting within his
sphere of delegated capacity can bind his Government. 2 Norway here, of course, went much further and issued a valid mining
license. Airgram-162 of 1962 goes on to relate the observations
61. An examination of message traffic from the Embassy in Oslo during
the past ten years indicates that the observations concerning Article 9(2) (d) were
correct.
CALTEX, the first major company to explore for oil in Spitzbergen, was

granted a search license for its activities.

In the 162d airgram telegram from

the U.S. Embassy, Oslo to the U.S. Dep't of State dated September 27, 1962,
the Embassy relates for the first time the observations of an economic geologist:

[a]lthough [he] is only too happy to have Caltex get the claims,
he thinks that the mining law was not fulfilled to the letter in the requirement that a proven presence of a resource is a requisite to the
granting of a claim. In the Caltex case . . . [a] Norwegian mining
inspector at Spitzbergen, apparently issued the concession without such
proven findings, and the Ministry of Industry, after a very stiff internal
disagreement, upheld the decision.

62. In the Eastern Greenland case the Permanent Court of International
Justice said of an oral statement by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Danish Minister:
Nevertheless, the point which must now be considered is whether
the Ihlen declaration--even if not constituting a definitive recognition
of Danish sovereignty-did not constitute an engagement obliging
Norway to refrain from occupying any part of Greenland.
o ' . The declaration which the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave
on July 22nd, 1919 was definitely affirmative: 'I told the Danish Minister today that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty in. the settlement of this question.'
The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, NO. 53. (It is curious that M. Ihlen's Declaration, now famous, was in part prompted by a quid
pro quo with Norway providing that if Denmark would not interfere with Norway's claim to Spitzbergen, Norway would refrain from objecting to Denmark's
claim over Greenland.)
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of A. Westerholm, the leader of the Caltex Oil Exploration Expedition in Spitzbergen: "Caltex, of course, cannot produce
samples of oil, but according to Westerholm, has submitted detailed geologic evidence in lieu thereof, and this, after some
63
quandary and delays, has been accepted by the Ministry.
In Airgram-522 of 12 July, 1964, the American Embassy
states:
In regard to oil drilling, the Treaty only makes slight
mention of oil and there are no mining regulations that spe64
cify how drilling will take place.
The problem was fully manifested on September 5, 1965,
largely due to the prominence it enjoyed in the national election
campaign in Norway in the same year. The cable relates that
Industry Minister Kjell Holler was responsible for the granting
of the concession. Although not submitted to the Cabinet of
Ministers, as Ministry of the Interior for Norway, Holler was the
ultimate superior of the Mining Commissioner for Svalbard and
as such eminently qualified to bind his Government to any decision reached regarding search licenses to oil and natural gas in
Spitzbergen. The cable also states that "[t]he Government [of
Norway] in defending itself has consistently taken the position
that, notwithstanding the poor manner in which the case was
handled, the Caltex concession agreement was and is a good
one from the Norwegian point of view." Thus, even the Norwegian Government is precluded from vitiating Holler's act, since it
actually publicly endorsed it; and whether Norway acted for financial reasons is of course immaterial. Internationally she is bound
to her act as manifested in the oil and gas search licenses she issues for exploration in Norway. It remains to examine such a
license.
An economic geologist provides us with a revealing remark:
Essentially, he thought that there was no foundation for the
Caltex concession issue. Some way had to be found to break
through the mining laws which were blocking progress in
developing Svalbard. To do sampling strictly in accordance
with the law would have required five years of drilling. He
felt that, however, there had to be correct geological sam63. 162d airgram telegram from U.S. Embassy, Oslo, to the U.S. Dep't of
State (1962).
64. 522d airgram telegram from U.S. Embassy, Oslo, to the U.S. Dep't of
State (1964).
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pling, and this had been done before the concession was
granted.

65

In discussing the licenses, the Norwegian Government established a commission to examine the regulations under which both
foreign and Norwegian companies could seek mining rights on
Svalbard, as well as the problems that had arisen as a result of the
interpretation of the Mining Regulations within the government
itself. The Commission published their results in the Fleischer
Report on October 1, 1965.66

Such documents make it unequivocally clear that Norway
is estopped from claiming that she understands the term "minerals," as used in the Mining Regulations of 1925 to be other
than inclusive of oil and natural gas.
One further point is pertinent in connection with the estoppel argument. Article 2(3) of the Mining Regulations states:
Any dispute as to whether a mineral or rock is of such nature as mentioned in item (1), shall be finally settled by
the Ministry concerned on report of the Commissioner of
Mines.

A conceiveable, but unlikely, argument which Norway might
raise would be that since the letter of June 3, 196667 provides that
65. 185th airgram telegram from U.S. Embassy, Oslo, to the U.S. Dep't of
State (1965).
66. The following represents selections from a resume on that report contained in the 279th airgram telegram from U.S. Embassy, Oslo of October 21,
1965:
The report points out that under Article 9(2)(d) of the Svalbard Mining Law, concessions to mine "coal, petroleum and other
minerals and ore" can only be granted on the basis of the submission of samples to the Svalbard Mining Commissioner. [emphasis
added]. The Fleischer Report then goes on to state that in the case
of the Caltex oil drilling concession it was admitted by the Ministry of Industry that it was obviously impossible to furnish samples
of oil at the time the application for the concession was made.
On the other hand, the report emphasized that Caltex did present data
on prospecting and seismographic studies showing that geologic indications of oil existed on Svalbard. While a Ministry of Industry official states in this connection that 'the data submitted by Caltex were
more comprehensive and more convincing than most samples that are
ordinarily submitted' the application was sent to the Ministry of Justice for the purpose of getting an informal interpretation of this point.
The Ministry of Justice conceded in its informal reply that the drilling
for oil such as envisaged by Caltex and the employment of expensive
oil rigs did not appear to be contemplated when the Svalbard Mining
Law was passed in 1925. However, in view of the fact that the Mining Law was based on an international treaty (the Paris Convention of
1920), it was necessary, advised the Justice Ministry, that the Foreign
Ministry be requested to consider the entire matter.
67. An official translation of a letter of June 3, 1966, from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Handicraft to the Mining Inspector for Sval-
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"the Mining Inspector should submit all matters concerning applications on the basis of geological indications to this advisory organ

(one of the Norwegian Ministry of Interior)," the decision on oil
and natural gas was not finally settled by the Commissioner of
Mines as required by the Mining Regulations. To this argument,
specious though it may be, the counterargument should be based
on articles 1-3 of the Mining Regulations."
bard stated, inter alia:

We refer to previous correspondence.
This Ministry assumes that it should be possible to grant oil
claims in Svalbard under the Mining Ordinance of August 7, 1925.

I) On the basis of a report accompanied by an oil sample
II) On the basis of a report accompanied by geological material
which satisfies the following requirements:
The intention is to establish an organ composed of two experts
who will assist the Mining Inspector in handling the various matters
relating to applications and claims for oil.
This organ will have an exclusively consultative function, but the
Mining Inspector should submit all matters concerning applications on
the basis of geological indications to this advisory organ, unless the application obviously must be rejected. This Ministry intends to appoint
the said advisory organ as soon as possible.
Amongst other issues, the last paragraph answers the first question raised
by this letter, i.e., whether or not criteria I and 1H in the letter were in the
conjunctive or disjunctive. As the last paragraph provides for applications
made "on the basis of geological indications," they are in the disjunctive.
This letter was afterwards referred to by the Mining Director for Svalbard
to a U.S. Corporation which applied for a search license for oil and gas, the
Greenland Exploration Management Company, Inc. It is quoted in its entirety:
We refer to your letter of 18 August 1971 with enclosures and
submit herewith Search License issued 1 September 1971. With regard to the granting of Production Concessions based on geological indications of oil, we refer to letter of 3 June 1966 in which the Department of Industry has established the criteria which must be satisfied
by registration of 'stake points' for geological indications of oil. Further, we make note of the rule of the Mining Code that it is not legal
to conduct search within 3rd parties' concession without securing permission from that party. [Emphasis added].
With regards,
Tormod Johnsen
Commissioner of Mines
Included with this letter and of even date was the following search license:
Greenland Exploration Management Company, Inc. .

.

. is hereby

granted admission to conduct exploration for period of 2 years from

this date for natural resources as named in the Mining Code for Sval-

bard, namely, coal, hydrocarbons and other minerals and ores. [Emphasis added].
The license is given with those rights, with that limitation and
with those liabilities as have been established in the above-mentioned
Mining Code.
The Search License is valid for: All of Svalbard.
Longyearbyen den 1. September 1971
Tormod Johnsen
See U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, 40A, INCO 16-1C.
68. Article 5 states in part:
1. The powers which according to the Mining Ordinance are conferred upon the Commissioner of Mines, may by the Ministry concerned, to such extent as needed, be delegated to inferior officers of
the mining service.
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It must be noted, with regard to the entire discussion on
the meaning of the term "minerals," that the decision does not
necessarily carry over to the waters and submerged lands outside
the territorial sea of Norway, even if the latter were construed
to be within Article 1 of the Treaty.
V.

DELIMITATION

OF THE CONTINENTAL

SHELF BETWEEN

NORWAY AND SPITZBERGEN

A.

A FactualComparison of the North Sea and
Barents Sea Questions

Before further examining whether the High Contracting Parties enjoy rights under Treaty article 3 to minerals lying seaward
of the territorial sea of Spitzbergen in and on its continental
shelf, one must first examine the fundamental question whether
Spitzbergen indeed has a continental shelf.
Norway has made it clear on several occasions that Spitzbergen does not have a continental shelf and that she (Norway)
views the continental shelf under the Barents Sea to be a continuation of the Norwegian continental shelf extending northward
from Scandinavia. In other words, that it is an integral part of
the Fennoscandian shield. This is of course a convenient
means for Norway to avoid entirely the issues presented by the
1920 treaty. If Spitzbergen has no continental shelf, mineral
rights enjoyed by the High Contracting Parties under the Treaty
would be limited in their seaward extent to four miles beyond
the base lines established by Norwegian Royal Decree of September 25, 1970; that is, the seaward boundary of the Spitzbergen territorial sea.
There are certain definite criteria established by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases69 which are helpful in resolving the issues in this section.
At the outset, it should be noted that there are several fundamental differences between the factual circumstances of the North
Sea Cases and that posed by Spitzbergen. The validity of any anal2. The decisions of such officers may be submitted to the Commissioner of Mines for reconsideration and the decisions of the Commissioner of Mines likewise to the Ministry provided the decisions have

not been given during a claim survey in which case the procedure
of § 13 applies.

3. The decisions of other inferior administrative authorities, with

reference to the Mining Code, also may be submitted to higher authority

for reconsideration.
69. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3.
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ogy drawn from the decision must be circumscribed by a recognition of and appreciation for these several factual differences.
(1) The waters of the North Sea are shallow, the whole seabed consisting of a continental shelf at a depth of less than 200
meters except for the formation known as the Norwegian
Trough, a belt of water 200-650 meters deep, fringing the
southern and southwestern coasts of Norway to a width averaging about 80-100 kilometers. In addition, there is a small localized depression in the center of the North Sea continental shelf,
the Devil's Hole, which is 780 feet deep. While the slope of the
continental shelf between Spitzbergen and Norway occurs well to
the west of the westernmost terrestrial meridian passing through
either Spitzbergen or Norway, the continental shelf itself is in many
areas much deeper than 200 meters. Thus, the Court in its
judgment did not have to address itself to the separate issues
posed by a continental shelf in excess of 200 meters, or to the
duality of definition contained in article 1 of the Convention
on the Continental Shelf of April 29, 1958.70
In this regard, however, the Court mentions the significance
of the Norwegian Trough:
Without attempting to pronounce on the status of that
feature [the Trough], the Court notes that the shelf areas in
the North Sea separated from the Norwegian coast by the
80-100 kilometres of the Trough cannot in any physical
sense be said to be adjacent to it, nor to be its natural prolongation. They are nevertheless considered by the States
parties to the relevant delimitations, as described in paragraph 4, to appertain to Norway up to the median lines
shown on Map 1. True these median lines are themselves
drawn on equidistance principles; but it was only by first
ignoring the existence of the Trough that these median lines
71
fell to be drawn at all.
With regard to the Trough issue, the Court did not possess
the requisite jurisdiction to determine the legal issues. Rather,
it merely notes that the parties agreed that a median line was to
be the boundary of the shelf between Norway and the United
Kingdom. Since that boundary was not an issue before the Court,
and was not contested by the Parties, the Court did not pass
judgment on that agreement.
70. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 15.
71. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [19691 I.C.J. 3, at 32.
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This North Sea boundary segment can be taken in substantiation of several different viewpoints which will probably be raised
in any subsequent agreement or judicial settlement of the Spitzbergen question. From Norway's viewpoint, the median line west
of the Trough is advantageous in that the presence of erosion
(Barents Trough) on the Barents Sea continental shelf between
Spitzbergen and Norway does not ipso facto determine the "nattural" boundary between the continental shelves of Spitzbergen
and Norway. In other words, Norway is not precluded from asserting that the mainland continental shelf is continuous and unbroken, running straight up to the territorial sea of Spitzbergen.
On the other hand, the treatment of the Trough by the I.C.J. and
the parties could lend support to the position advanced by the
High Contracting Parties, viz., that insofar as opposite States
vis-ii-vis adjacent States are concerned, continental shelf areas
should be delimited in accordance with equidistance principles as
expressed by median lines. This would give Norway and Spitzbergen a separate continental shelf. However, as the observation
regarding the Norwegian Trough by the I.C.J. cannot qualify even
as obiter dicta, great significance cannot be attached to the Norwegian-United Kingdom boundary.
(2) In the second instance, the judgment proper was based
on adjacent and not opposite States. 2 While principles of
equidistance apply equally to equidistant lines between adjacent
States and lateral median lines between opposite States, the I.C.J.
went to some length to distinguish the legal weight accorded to
each.
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention treats adja73
cent and opposite coasts separately.
72. The United Kingdom is the only "opposite" state that could have been
involved; however, she was not a party before the court.

73. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 15, art. 6. 1:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two

or more States whose coasts are opposite each other the boundary of
the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless

another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the bound-

ary line is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the

nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured.
Article 6 § (2) states:

Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of

two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances,

the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant
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As both Spitzbergen and Norway are opposite each other,
little discussion is necessary on the manner in which the Court
arrived at its decision that "the use of the equidistance method
of delimitation [is] not obligatory as between the Parties" and
that "there [is] no other single method of delimitation the use of
which is in all circumstances obligatory," for this decision is predicated on equidistance lines between adjacent States and not lateral median lines between opposite States. The Court rejected
the former as the primary contention governing shelf delimination
questions because the equidistance method "despite its known
advantages, leads unquestionably to inequity, . . . .
However, the Court did distinguish between equidistance
lines and median lines. In referring to the International Law
Commission, the Court stated that:
Less difficulty was felt over that of the median line boundary between opposite States, although it too is an equidistance line. For this there seems to the Court to be good
reason. The continental shelf area off, and dividing opposite States, can be claimed by each of them to be a natural
prolongation of its territory. These prolongations meet and
overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a
median line, and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and
minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other means,
such a line must effect an equal division of the particular
area involved .

. .

. This type of case is therefore different

from that of laterally adjacent States on the same coast with
no immediately opposite coast in front of it, and does not give
rise to the same kind of problems-a conclusion which also
finds some confirmation in the difference of language to be
observed in the two paragraphs of Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention . . . as respects recourse in the one case to

median lines and in the other to lateral equidistance lines,
75
in the event of absence of agreement.
In similar vein, the Court later stated:
Finally, it appears that in almost all of the cases cited, the
delimitations concerned were median-line delimitations between opposite States, not lateral delimitations between adjacent States. For reasons which have already been given
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.
74. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 49.

75. Id., at 36-37.
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(paragraph 57) the Court regards the case of median-line
delimitations between opposite States as different in various
respects, and as being sufficiently distinct not to constitute
a precedent for the delimitation of lateral boundaries.7 6

While this is certainly not positive endorsal of median lines as
the criterion governing such delimitations, it at least indicates
that the Court does not find median lines between opposite
states inherently inequitable. It should be noted that in the discussions of both principles, and in the language employed in
article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, 77 the Court and
the Convention refer to the "territories of two or more
States" when talking of adjacency. This is perfectly natural since
the Convention and the Court (in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases) were dealing with sovereign territorial States as respective parties, and the anomalous situation of Spitzbergen
was not envisaged. Norway could therefore muster the argument that since Spitzbergen is not a State in the legal sense of the
word and certainly not a separate sovereign State vis-ii-vis Norway, neither the Convention nor the Court's judgment is applicable in the Spitzbergen situation. However, as indicated below, the Court placed major emphasis on the geographic-geologic nature of the continental shelf as a prolongation of the land to
which the shelf was most naturally adjacent. The emphasis is
more on the physical fact of the presence of opposing land
masses and not on abstract legal concepts of Statehood or sovereignty. In this light, such an initial objection by Norway would
find little merit were the case submitted to the I.C.J. for deliberaion.
(3) If one casts Norway in Germany's role in the North
Sea ContinentalShelf judgment, he would find that Germany was
neither a signatory nor an adherent to the Continental Shelf Convention, whereas Norway became an adherent in December, 1971.
Therefore, while article 6 of the Convention was not binding on
Germany in a contractual sense, it is binding on Norway. Much
of the Court's examination on this point can therefore be disregarded. So far as the other criteria established by the court in delimitation problems connected with article 6 are concerned, Norway should be held to a stricter observance than was Germany.
76. id., at 45.
77. See note 73 supra.
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B. DelimitationCriteriawhich the CourtFound Inapplicable
in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Case
Before examining what criteria the Court held to be applicable in delimiting the North Sea continental shelf, the following
are those which the Court did not find applicable:
1) the doctrine of the just and equitable share appears to be
wholly at variance with what the Court entertains to be the most
fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental
s

shelf ;7

2) the equidistance principle was not regarded as a rule of
customary international law on the basis of either a priori logi7
cal necessity or through positive law -processes; 1
3) the equidistance principle could not be considered as an
emerging rule of customary international law;80
4) the equidistance principle could not be regarded as declaratory of previously existing or emergent rule of customary
81
law;
5) the equidistance principle could not be regarded as having achieved the status of a rule of customary international law
binding on all States since the Convention, i.e., it could not be regarded as having become opinio juris since the Convention.8 2
The Netherlands and Denmark both conceded at the outset
that Germany was not contractually bound to the Convention."
However, the two countries attempted to establish that "by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways,
the Republic has unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has manifested its acceptance of the conventional regime; or has recognized it as being applicable to the delimitation
' 84
of continental shelf areas.
The Court did not find any substance in these contentions,
and the same should hold for Norway's conduct. Although she
78. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 37.
79. Id., at 37.
80. Id., at 39.

81. Id., at 41.
82. Id.
83. "It is admitted on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands that

in these circumstances the Convention cannot, as such, be binding on
the Federal Republic, in the sense of the Republic being contractually
bound by it."
Id., at 25.

84. Id.
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has many times maintained that the Continental Shelf Convention
was customary law, 5 the Court held that estoppel could arise in
the case of Germany only "[b]y reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that regime [i.e., the Continental Shelf Convention],
but also had caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on
such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some
prejudice. "8
Norway has never granted any licenses under the Mining
Regulations for Spitzbergen beyond the four mile territorial sea, nor
has she intimated that she so intended. It is, therefore, improbable that valid grounds for estoppel could arise.
C. Delimitation Criteriawhich the Court Found in the
North,Sea ContinentalShelf Cases
Criterion 1: Equitable Principles.-Article6(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf states:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories
of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other,
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such
States shall be determined by agreement between them. In
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the
median line, every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of
87
the territorial sea of each State is measured.
With due regard for the phrase "two or more States," the
Court placed primary emphasis in any shelf delimitation issue on
the need for agreement between the governments of the two opposite States.8 8 This stress on agreement and on agreement
85. E.g., Department of State Airgram 050810 of 201514Z Mar. 73.
86. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 26.
87. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 15, art. 6. 1.

88. The Court stated in its judgment while discussing the validity of the
equidistance principle:
In the first place, Article 6 is so framed as to put second the obligation to make use of the equidistance method, causing it to come
after a primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 42.
And in the same regard:
It emerges from the history of the development of the legal regime
of the continental shelf, which has been reviewed earlier, that the essential reason why the equidistance method is not to be regarded as a
rule of law is that, if it were to be compulsorily applied in all situa-

tions, this would not be consonant with certain basic legal notions
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based on equitable principles recalls the language of the Truman
Proclamation, which stated that continental shelf boundaries
"shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles." '
The Court,
alluding to the Proclamation, the requirement for agreement, and
equitable principles, stated:
These two concepts, of delimitation by mutual agreement
and delimitation in accordance with equitable principles,
have underlain all the subsequent history of the subject.
They were reflected in various other State proclamations of
the period, and after, and in the later work on the subject. 90
It is clear that were the Court to examine the Spitzbergen
question, it would first insist on meaningful and sincere negotiation between Norway and the High Contracting Parties as a
prerequisite to resolving the question. What is not clear is of
what the substantive discussions in such a negotiation would consist. While appreciative of the fact that it would be inappropriate, if not actually impossible, to formulate such substantive issues, it is necessary to mention one of them.
As indicated, equitable principles would necessarily loom
large in the discussions. Article 6, indicates that if there are any
"special circumstances" involved, they must be examined in determining the shelf boundary. While the Court did not find
the concave configuration of Germany's North Sea coast to be a
"special circumstance" within the meaning of article 6, there is
little doubt that the unusual regime established in Spitzbergen
consequent to the 1920 Treaty on the Status of Spitzbergen and
the many questions which that Treaty raises would so qualify.
What remains is to determine which aspects of the 1920 Treaty
would receive priority.
Given the emphasis the Court places on the importance
of equitable principles, the situation which prevailed in Spitzbergen leading up to the Treaty should be the important, if not parawhich, as has been observed in paragraphs 48 and 55, have from the
beginning reflected the opinio juris in the

matter of delimitation;

those principles being that delimitation must be the object of agreement
between the States concerned, and that such agreement must be arrived

at in accordance with equitable principles.

Id., at 46.
89. United States Presidential Proclamation 2667, Sept. 28, 1945: Natural
Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg.
12303, 59, Stat. 884 [hereinafter cited as Truman Proclamation].
90. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 33.
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mount, factor in resolving the envisaged negotiation along equitable principles. There are two approaches which immediately
come to mind.
First, and perhaps most conventional, the earlier discussion of
the fravaux preparatoiresto the Treaty would be indicative of the
equities involved. As pointed out earlier, each of the High Contracting Parties, and the United States in particular, raised no
objection (with the possible exception of Sweden) that Norway
enjoyed the paramount claim to sovereignty over the Archipelago. This was not merely because of her part in helping the
Allied Cause during the First War, but more significantly, because of the historical role Norway took in the discovery, development, and supplying of Spitzbergen.
The United States Department of State, it will be remembered, believed as late as 1904 that Spitzbergen belonged to Russia. It was only in 1906 that any American national or corporation (the Arctic Coal Company) made a claim in Spitzbergen.
The Company was the sole American company ever to have any
claim, mineral or otherwise, to the Archipelago, and it was sold in
1916 to a Swedish concern. Therefore, at the time of the Spitzbergen Commission Conference which drew up the agreement
that was to become the 1920 Treaty on the Status of Spitzbergen, the United States had no interest in the Archipelago. The
statements of the United States' representative, Mr. Nielson, during the Conference indicate without any doubt that the United
States had no real interest in the Archipelago save that the
rights of existing claimants be honored. The interests of the
United States at the time of the Treaty were so nondescript as to
be non-existent. 9
Under the second approach, it might be considered an equitable solution of a special situation to allow only those States among
the original High Contracting Parties who had mineral claims in
91. Evidence of this dilemma is apparent from the following telegram that
was sent from the United States' Ambassador to France to the Secretary of State
on July 26, 1919:

In view previous participation our government in solution Spitz-

bergen Q. [i.e., before the First War when the Arctic Coal Company
was still in American hands], and since our recognition of Norwegian
sovereignty must presumably be given in some other way if we do not
sign prepared treaty and since we incur no obligation apart from recognition Norwegian sovereignty, all other obligations being on part Norway, it is suggested our participation as signatory may be desirable.

U.S. Archives: Versailles Peace Conference Case, American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Paris 1918-19) Case 184.00101/121 (emphasis added).
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Spitzbergen extant at the time of the Treaty to enjoy rights to
minerals in the soil and subsoil of the continental shelf off Spitzbergen beyond the territorial sea, if indeed it is resolved that the
High Contracting Parties enjoy such mineral rights. In any case,
it would be inequitable to grant mineral rights in the continental shelf of Spitzbergen to any subsequent adherents (as distinguished from original signatories) to the 1920 Treaty. Since
the major powers with any real interest had already recognized
Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen, subsequent recognition
by adherents would, practically speaking, not alter appreciably
Norway's sovereignty over the Archipelago. While a treaty in itself does not bind non-parties, the majority of the adherents
were countries that never had any real claim to Spitzbergen. If
they had such a claim, they would have (with the possible exception of Russia, at that time the R.S.F.S.R.) undoubtedly been
among the original signatories, or at least would have participated
in the 1919 Spitzbergen Commission. Their withholding of recognition from what had actually become a fait accompli would
have little significance.
Moreover, Norway would have far
greater claim to sovereignty over Spitzbergen than any of the adherents based on historical conduct alone, apart from any recognition resulting from the 1920 Treaty.
In conclusion, from an equitable standpoint the United
States would be highly unlikely to prevail in any discussion with
Norway under the guidelines the Court enunciated in the North
Sea ContinentalShelf Cases.
Criterion 2: Natural Prolongation of the Land.-The Court
found, of all criteria it examined, that the consequences of the
continental shelf being a "natural prolongation of the land"
should be the primary one in any continental shelf delimitation.
This language was also conspicuous in the Truman Proclamation. 2
In a direct application of this principle to Spitzbergen and the
Barents Sea subterranean shelf, the natural boundary between
Northern Norway and the Spitzbergen Archipelago (including
Bear Island) becomes the Barents Trough. Taken at an isobath
of 400 meters, it clearly forms a natural division between the
Norwegian and Spitzbergen shelves. The 200 meter isobath to the
south of Bear Island, (the southern 200 meter isobath of the
Spitzbergen banks, where the present exploration for continental
92. See Truman Proclamation, supra note 90.
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shelf oil is being conducted) is located 44 miles to the south on a
rhumb line connecting the closest points of mainland Norway
and Bear Island. Twenty miles further along this line brings
one to the 400 meter isobath. It is clear that this 20 mile area
between the 200 and 400 meter isobath south of Bear Island
marks the end of the "most natural extension of the land ter-

ritory of [the] coastal State" (Spitzbergen), for ten miles further
along the same line, we enter an isobath circle whose center is
590 meters in depth. One must travel approximately sixty-eight
nautical miles along this same rhumb line, from the 400 meter
isobath south of Bear Island, before reaching the 400 meter isobath on the Norwegian side of the Barents Trough. One travels
south more than one hundred miles along the same rhumb line
before reaching the 200 meter isobath, which is only seven miles
along off the coast of Norway. In comparison, one can travel
well over two hundred miles in a northerly direction from the two
hundred meter isobath to the south of Bear Island, to Edge Island,
and never travel beyond the two hundred meter isobath.
The result is that Spitzbergen clearly has a natural shelf of
its own within the meaning of the Court's judgment in the North
Sea ContinentalShelf Cases.93
93. The Court said:
More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and equitable share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court entertains no doubt is the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating
to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention, though quite independent of it,-namely that the rights of
the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea exist as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for
the purposes of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, at 22.
It is only in this area of the Court's decision that any language can be
found which can directly be used in substantiation that Spitzbergen does have
a continental shelf of its own, and that Norway cannot claim that her continental shelf extends northward to include the continental shelf around Spitzbergen. In another part of the judgment the Court stated:
More fundamental than the notion of proximity appears to be the
principle-constantly relied upon by all the Parties--of the natural
prolongation or continuation of the land territory or domain, or land
sovereignty of the coastal State, into and under the high seas, via the
bed of its territorial sea which is under the full sovereignty of that
State. There are various ways of formulating this principle, but the
underlying idea, namely of an extension of something already possessed, is the same, and it is this idea of extension which is, in the
Court's opinion, determinant. Submarine areas do not really appertain
to the coastal State because-or not only because-they are near it.
They are near it of course; but this would not suffice to confer title,
any more than, according to a well-established principle of law recognized by both sides in the present case, mere proximity confers per se
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In substantiation of the above views, the Court, in the
North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, stated:
The continental shelf of any State must be the natural
prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon
what 94
is the natural prolongation of the territory of another
State.
It is further stated:
The appurtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of
whose coastlines it lies, is therefore a fact, and it can be useful to consider the geology of that shelf in order to find out
whether the direction taken by certain configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain localities, they point up the whole notion of the appurtenance of
the continental shelf to the State whose territory it does in
fact belong. 95
Additional geologic substantiation of both the natural prolongation and the unity of deposit theories is found in a study
made by the Greenland Management Company, Inc.9 6
The
study was made to indicate oil potential in Spitzbergen and its
continental shelf. While being tempted to read between the
lines that this study was in part made with an eye to the North
Sea judgment, one can but mention the obvious fact that one
cannot alter the sedimentary and metamorphic geological features on which the study is based.
Generally speaking, the study indicates that Spitzbergen was
never part of Scandinavia or Europe. Rather, Spitzbergen
formed the northeastern part of Greenland, which, together with
Ellemere Island in the northwestern sector of Baffin Bay, were
a unit before Spitzbergen split off from Greenland along the
Nansen Fracture zone in the northeastern sector of the Greenland
Sea. The import of this is that Norway, in light of the North
title to land territory. What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the coastal State in respect of its continental
shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to
be actually part of the territory over which the coastal State already
has dominion,-in the sense that, although covered with water, they
are a prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of
it under the sea. From this it would follow that whenever a given
submarine area does not constitute a natural-or the most naturalextension of the land territory of a coastal State, even though that area

may be closer to it than it is to the territory of any other State, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State; ....
Id., at 31 (emphasis added).
94. Id., at 47.
95. Id., at 51.
96. See note 67 supra.
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Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, can not claim that her continental shelf extends to Spitzbergen, and that Spitzbergen has no inde97
pendent continental shelf of her own.

97. Quoting from the study, "Geology and Petroleum Potential," of the
Greenland Exploration Management Company, Inc., in order to give scientific
evidence of this phenomenon:
Tectonics
A review must be made of the regional and even of global tectonics around the Svalbard area to fully appreciate the petroleum potential. The enclosed figures show the present (Figure 1) and Gemco's concept of the pre-drift configuration (Figure 2) of the cratonic
masses bordering the Scandic Sea. The 'Scandic Sea' describes here
the region between the Western front and Eastern margin of Caledonian folding, and is the sea that opened up into the combined seas of the
Greenland Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. It will be
noted that we hypothesize an intimate connection between Svalbard
and Ellesmere Island at the northern tip of Greenland. It is further
postulated that no drift, but only local tectonic movements took place
in the Barents Sea region, the shallow sea floor of which extends the
Fennoscandian Shield to. Svalbard.
The northwestward drift of Greenland between 80 and 40 million years ago is hypothesized to have taken place along practically
straight lines bounded to the north by the Nansen Fracture Zone. This
fracture zone separated Svalbard from Peary Land in what now is Northeastern Greenland. Simultaneously, as the Baffin Bay opened up a
practically straight southwesterly translation took place of the Ellesmere Island and separated Ellesmere Island from Northwestern Greenland and further increased the distance between Ellesmere Island and
Svalbard.
Positive evidence that Svalbard was once a part of Northeastern
Greenland is derived from the geology of the two areas. The Palaeozoic beds on Svalbard all seem to have been deposited from west to
east from a land area west of Svalbard. This land area could have
only been Northeast Greenland in view of our present knowledge. A
scarpment is running parallel with the western coast of Svalbard and
an abyssal depth is reached immediately west thereof. Since no subsidence of such a magnitude can be imagined, a drifting continental
mass must have been located immediately west of Svalbard in Lower
and Middle Devonian times.
Orogeny
Geological substantiation in support of the hypothesis that Ellesmere Island formed the Northwestern part of Greenland and butted
up against Svalbard is found by comparing the North Greenland foldin with the folding on Ellesmere Island. In North Greenland the
Older Palaeozoic series can be followed from the south into the folding
chain where the youngest layers are dated in the Siluric. Younger sequences are missing.
On Ellesmere Island we find Devonian marine deposits in the folding chain and no discordance between the layering from the Siluric to
the Devonian. Consequently, we are led to believe that the folding
on Ellesmere Island originally was parallel to instead of being a continuation of the North Greenland folding. It later subsided, allowing
the Devonian marine deposits similar to those found on Svalbard.
The result of the original Svalbard/Greenland position is that the
Svalbard could instead be younger and direct extensions of the folding
on Ellesmere Island and running parallel to the North Greenland folding, and perpendicular to the Caledonian folding in Eastern Greenland.
The North Greenland folding is believed to have taken place in at
least three separate periods generally called Hercynian, the latest of
which took place in Lower Carbon. Most of the geological evidence
on Svalbard would place the north-south axis folding in Devonian times
and thus making it part of the early Hercynian orogeny.
The hypothesis is further supported by the fact that the North
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Criterion 3: Natural Unity of Deposits.-If this index is not
sufficient to establish the existence of a Spitzbergen continental
shelf, the Court gives one other which further substantiates this
conclusion:
[ifn balancing the factors in question it would appear that
various aspects must be taken into account. Some are related
to the geological, others to the geographical aspect of the
situation, others again to the idea of the unity of any deposits.98

This principle militates in favor of Spitzbergen, for as far as exploration to date has revealed, the oil and natural gas deposits
lie exclusively to the north of the Barents Trough, and nothing
has been found to the south.
There are two other authorities that lend further credence
to the validity of this criterion. In the Truman Proclamation of
1945, President Truman based the United States' claim to the
continental shelf, inter alia, on the fact that the continental shelf
resources. "[F]requently form a seaward extension of a pool or
Greenland folded mountains are characterized by increased metamorphosis towards the north, but fall short of gneiss and [sic] granite.
The missing and most strongly metamorphosed part of North Greenland could be the Hekla Hoek series on Svalbard. An area of strong
folding would have created a weak part of the pre-drift craton and
the ensuing fracture zone would run along that weak line and from the
northern edge for Greenland's later drift.
With regard to the above excerpt from the study note that under the section "Tectonics" at the end of the first paragraph, the following was included:
"it is further postulated that no drift, but only local tectonic movements took
place in the Barents Sea region, the shallow sea floor of which extends the
Fennoscandian Shield to Svalbard." This refers to the fact that much earlier than
the continental drift occurred, the depression represented by the Barents Trough
was not a depression but rather a continuous area connecting both sides of the
Trough in a continuous plan. However, about 400 or 500 million years ago, the
present trough came into being, the result of tectonic orogeny. The present Trough
represents as great a geologic phenomenon as does a fracture zone or a continental drift episode. The present trough, filled with many layers of sedimentary
deposits on top of the original stratigraphy, therefore represents as natural a
division between the opposing sides as could be entertained from a geologic
standpoint. Moreover, the stratigraphic layers on the islands of the Spitzbergen
Archipelago are part of the same formations which dip down under the territorial sea of Spitzbergen and continue through what may be referred to as the
Spitzbergen continental shelf. This continuity, on which the Court places so
much emphasis, represents a feature known as "dip" geologically speaking. Apparently, these factors outweigh the initial (i.e., 500 million years ago) horizontal continuity of the Barents sea basin, and militate in favor of the recognition of a separate Spitzbergen continental shelf.
98. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment) [1969] I.C.J. 3, 51-52
(emphasis added).
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deposit lying within the territory . ... ,0 The Court, in its
judgment in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, in determining
the delimitation of the territorial sea of Norway, stated:
[S]ome reference must be made to the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain.
The real question raised in the choice of baselines is
in effect whether certain sea areas lying within these lines are
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject
to the regime of internal waters.' 00
While the Court in this context was addressing itself more to
the socio-economic aspects of being "linked to the land domain,"
especially with regard to fishing, inherent not only in this section
of the Court's judgment but also in the entire opinion was the
geographical-geological relationship of the islands to mainland
Norway. Applied to Spitzbergen even from this primary socioeconomic view, it is evident that any exploration or exploitation
of minerals outside the territorial sea of Spitzbergen would have
to be sustained from the islands of the Archipelago, mainland
Norway being, as indicated, more than 350 miles to the south.
It seems to follow from this criterion enunciated by the Court and
the Truman Proclamation that there are two separate and distinct banks, the one appertaining to Spitzbergen, the other to
Norway.
Criterion 4: The Need for Concurrent Criteria.-In spite
of the above indicia and the conclusions drawn therefrom, an examination of the actual delimitation of the two shelves on the
above principles can well lead to that very state of inequity which
the Court so scrupulously attempted to avoid. Throughout the
Judgment, the Court stresses the need for a plurality of criteria to reach any equitable delimitation.' 0 '
99. See Truman Proclamation, supra note 90.
100. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 133.
101. If for the above reasons equity excludes the use of the equidistance method in the present instance, as the sole method of delimitation, the question arises whether there is any necessity to employ one
method for the purposes of given delimitation. There is no logical
basis for this, and no objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a
delimitation of adjoining continental shelf areas by the concurrent use
of various methods. The Court has already stated why it considers that
the international law of continental shelf delimitation does not involve
any imperative rule and permits resort to various principles or methods,
as may be appropriate, or a combination of them, provided that, by the
application of equitableprinciples, a reasonable result is arrived at.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Judgment), [1969] I.C.J. 3, 49.
It has however been maintained that no one method of delimita-
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Purely on the basis of natural prolongation and its concomitant aspects, geology and geography, the edges of the Berents Trough would mark the limits of the Norwegian and Spitzbergen continental shelves. If this criterion taken in vacuo were
to be the determinant, it would mean that the Spitzbergen continental shelf would include the only areas in the Berents Sea
known to contain significant deposits of oil and natural gas. Confining the shelf to the two hundred meter isobath would of
course not accomplish anything constructive in resolving the
problem. As depths greater than 200 meters are attained within
the Norwegian territorial sea along the entire northern coast of
the State, little equity would be inherent in such a solution.
Certainly, if the entire shelf issue, as indicated by the Court,
should start out by meaningful negotiation between Norway and
the High Contracting Parties, reliance on this criterion alone
would hardly encourage success in the discussions.
With regard to the application of median lines to the Norwegian and Spitzbergen continental shelves, it is instructive that
in the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between Denmark and Norway, signed at Oslo, on 8 December,
1965, Denmark and Norway agreed that in as far as the exploration and utilization of natural resources are concerned:
The boundary between that portion of the continental shelf
over which sovereignty is exercised by Denmark and Norway,
respectively, shall be the median line which at every point
is situated at an equal distance from the nearest point on the
base lines from which the width of the outer
territorial wa10 2
ters of the Contracting Parties is measured.
While this Agreement is of course not binding on Norway in
any subsequent agreement or negotiation concerning the delimitation of the Norwegian and Spitzbergen continental shelves, it
is noteworthy that she has in the past recognized the equidistance
principle as an equitable and viable means of delimiting the
respective shelves of opposing States.
tion can prevent such [inequitable] results and that all can lead to
relative injustices ....
It can only strengthen the view that it is necessary to seek not one method of delimitation but one goal.
Id., at 50.
The import of this language to Spitzbergen becomes all the more apparent
when the results of applying the criteria of natural prolongation, geology, geography, socio-economic links, and unity of deposits are evidenced.
102. Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Denmark and Norway, December 8, 1965, U.N.T.S. No. 9052.
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In a similar vein, although not a signatory to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Norway did accede to the Convention in December, 1971. At the time of her accession, Norway made a revealing statement with regard to the nature of her
accession; 10 3 however, she did not find acceptable a reservation
made by France stating that:
In the absence of a specific agreement, the Government of the French Republic will not accept that any boundary of the continental shelf determined by application of
the principle of equidistance shall be involved against it:
-if such boundary is calculated from baselines established after 29 April, 1958;
-if it extends beyond the 200 meter isobath;
-if it lies in areas where, in the Government's opinion,
there are "special circumstances" within the meaning of Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, that is to say: the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of Granville, and the sea areas of the Straits
of Dover and of the North Sea off the French coast.
While this statement likewise could not be used against Norway, equitable estoppel could not be asserted against her in any
action (or inaction) taken by her to date in relation to Spitzbergen (or to her own northern continental shelf). This is clear
since both her protest of the reservation of France, and her own
lack of reservation regarding article 6 of the 1958 Continental
Shelf Convention would indicate her acceptance of the article,
not merely of the provision for agreement, but of the principle of
median lines. In the Spitzbergen-Norwegian delimitation question, the applicable median line, were one to be used, would certainly be one (a) calculated from baselines established after
April 29, 1958 (it will be remembered the baselines for the territorial sea of Spitzbergen were established in 1970); (b) extending
beyond the 200 meter isobath; (c) falling within areas in which
there are "special circumstances" within the meaning of article 6
(that is, the regime established by the Treaty on the Status
of Spitzbergen of February 8, 1920). If the issue were raised
against Norway, she no doubt would maintain that the reservation was directed solely against France only insofar as the latter's
103. Note from the legal counsel of the U.N. dated October 4, 1971, (ref.
C.N. 152, 1971 TREATIES-12):
In depositing their instrument of accession regarding the said Convention, the Government of Norway declares that they do not find
acceptable the reservations made by the Government of the French Republic to Article 5, Paragraph 1, and to Article 6, §§ 1 and 2.
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exclusion of the enumerated waters around the French coast,
viz., "The Bay of Biscay, the Bay of Granville, and the sea
areas of the Straits of Dover and of the North Sea off the French
coast." It and the 1965 Agreement between Denmark and Norway are indications of Norway's acceptance (albeit in another set
of factual circumstances) of the equity of median lines as a
criterion in continental shelf delimitations.
It is beneficial, for the purpose of hypothesizing on the
delimitation issue, to view the problem without reference to the
1920 Treaty. Leaving it temporarily aside, focusing solely
on the various criteria considered by the court, and given the geologic aspects earlier considered, the logical solution would be
for a median line to be drawn between the opposing four hundred
meter isobath contours on either side of the Barents Trough.
This would not only uphold the natural prolongation and unity
of deposit criteria, but would be more equitable than relying solely on a lateral median line between Bear Island and Nordkapp
(the northernmost point of the Norwegian coast). This solution
would, as indicated, artificially truncate the Norwegian Continental Shelf before it reached the furthest extent of its natural prolongation and dipped into the Barents Trough.
The other side of the "Barents Trough" median line
would be the Spitzbergen Continental Shelf. With regard once
again to the 1920 Treaty, and, in the light of the application of
Lord Asquith's Award in In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the
Sheikh of Abu Dhabi'" to mineral rights to the continental shelf
under the 1920 Treaty, since the High Contracting Parties do not
enjoy mineral rights to the Spitzbergen Continental Shelf, Norway would not be in a position to complain of the inequity of
such a delimitation. Practically speaking, she would be sovereign over both shelves on either side of the Barents Trough median line, and the problem would be moot. It is only in the case
that Lord Asquith's opinion were not taken to apply to the situation that the problem would be exacerbated; except for the reasons developed in this paper, this would not be the case. But if it
were, the metes just described should not be in any way invalidated, for they precede not from a legal viewpoint within the
frame of the Treaty, but on the basis of the physical attributes
of the Barents Sea floor. Any inequalities resultant therefrom
104. 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247 (1952).
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should be the matter of negotiations between Norway and the
High Contracting Parties.
VI.

DELIMITATION OF THE SPITZBERGEN CONTINENTAL

SHELF TO THE EAST AND WEST OF THE ARCHIPELAGO

Charts of the Arctic Ocean Floor reveal that the type of
submarine terrain discussed above is in no way like the submarine terrain at issue in the delimitation of the Continental
Shelf between Spitzbergen and Greenland (Peary Land and King
Whereas the Barents Trough repreFrederik VIII Land).
sents a geosyncline formed by tectonic orogeny, the Nansen
Fracture Zone represents a continuing volcanic upheaval and
splitting (but not a folding) along what today is considered to
be the very margin of opposing continental plates under the continental drift theory. Whereas the Barents Trough reaches a
maximum depth of six hundred feet, the Nansen Fracture Zone
reaches in many places depths in excess of eleven thousand feet.
The volcanic Arctic Mid-Oceanic Ridge is a continuing phenomenon extending from Iceland to the Sadko Trough in the Laptev Sea off Northern Siberia, which, when connected (and any
logical conceptualization of it would so do) with the Reykjanes
Ridge on the south side of Iceland and the Mid-Atlantic Ridge,
forms a clear divide between the two hemispheres from pole to
pole.
In this Spitzbergen-Greenland delimitation, the primary
question is the effect of the mid-ocean trench on the delineation
proceeding. The problem of the duality of the definition of the
continental shelf inherent in article 1 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf has already been discussed. Before resorting to the median line for delimitation, several remarks made
by the Fourth Committee of the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea concerning the Norwegian Trough are pertinent. Before citing them, several factual distinctions must be
made. The Norwegian Trough can hardly be compared in a
geological sense to the Arctic Mid-Oceanic Ridge (Nansen Cordillera), of which the Nansen Fracture Zone is a part. The Norwegian Trough is clearly a part of the European Continental
Shelf under the North Sea and represents (as does the Barents
Trough) a gentle folding of the submarine surface into a geosyndine. The Nansen Cordillera is the umbilical chord of the
European and American continental land masses. The greatest
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depth attained in the Norwegian Trough is 1,330 feet; in the
Nansen Cordillera, a depth of 14,800 feet is obtained in the Pole
Abyssal Plain to the east of the Lomonosov Ridge. This is not
surprising for the Nansen Cordillera and Nansen Fracture Zone
bottom in the deep ocean floor; the Norwegian Trough, but on
the European Continental Shelf.
The import of the remarks by the Fourth Committee on
the Continental Shelf must therefore be viewed with proper
regard for the factual dichotomy just described.
On 13 March, 1958, during the General Debate on Article
67, Mr. Gomez Robeldo (Mexico) stated:
The text of article 67 should include a reference to special cases-mentioned in paragraph 8 of the International
Law Commission's commentary-of areas of the continental
shelf separated from it by channels deeper than 200 metres,
but such special cases should not be dealt with as exceptions to the general rule. It would be better to add to article
67 a paragraph to the effect that the outer limit of the continental shelf would not be affected when it included areas
divided from it by channels of a greater depth than that laid
down in the first paragraph of the article. If other delegations supported that view, he would submit an amendment to
that effect. 10 5
On 24 March, Miss Gutteridge (United Kingdom), in referring to the same problem, stated (selon le rapporteur):
[T]hat the joint proposal, which contained no definition of the continental shelf, sought in paragraph 1 to make
clear that the provisions applied to the seabed and subsoil
of all submarine areas adjacent to the mainland or island
coasts. On the latter question, her delegation reserved its
position until the Commission came to deal with Article 72,
because the present article was not concerned with the drawing of median and lateral lines. In cases where-as off the
west coast of Norway-there was a deep channel immediately off the coast, the provisions would apply in the same
way as to a continental shelf in the geological sense of the
term. 10 6
On 25 March, 1958, Mr. Stabell (Norway) said (selon le
Rapporteur):
[H]e thanked the representative of the United Kingdom for
105. U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 13/42, at 15 (1958).

106. Id., at 41.
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her statement (17th meeting) about the configuration of the
seabed off the Norwegian coast, expressing a view which was
in conformity with that of scientific experts. It confirmed
his delegation's view that the Norwegian trough was a part
of the continental shelf, and did not exclude Norway from
10 7
the seabed beyond it.
Examining these statements individually for points useful
in the Spitzbergen-Greenland delimitation question, it should be
noted that in Mr. Robeldo's remark, he refers neither to
trenches nor to troughs, but merely to " . . . areas of the conti-

nental shelf separated from it by channels deeper than 200
metres." While the Norwegian Trough could easily be classified
as a channel, the Nansen Cordillera and Fracture Zone could in
no way be so considered. Not only is the Zone far deeper than any
channel; it is the result of geologic volcanic activity and not of erosion, underwater currents, or mere folding.
With regard to Miss Gutteridge's remark, which mentions
the Norwegian Trough, apparently it was the understanding of
the United Kingdom (as subsequently evident in the Anglo-Norwegian Agreement in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
Judgment) that "deep channels immediately off the coast" of a
State would not ipso facto artificially terminate what would
otherwise be a continuation of that State's continental shelf. Not
surprisingly, this understanding was endorsed by Mr. Stabell (Norway), as "it confirmed his delegation's view that the Norwegian
Trough was a part of the continental shelf, and did not exclude
Norway from this seabed beyond it." In addition, the United
Kingdom's joint proposal, while failing to provide a definition
of the continental shelf, did provide that "[tihe coastal State exercises over the submarine areas referred to in Article 67, up to a
depth of water of 550 metres, sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the seabed and
subsoil of such areas."' 8 Such a depth limitation of course
excludes the possible inclusion of the Nansen Fracture Zone in the
same category as the Norwegian Trough.
It is unnecessary to examine these remarks and the lack
of protest thereto voiced by the other members of the Fourth
Committee from the viewpoint of the binding nature of such
107. Id., at 48.
108. U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 13/C.4/L.44, art. 68.
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remarks, as the manner in which each is phrased indicates that
whatever they meant by using the term "channel," "deep channel," and "trough" in conjunction with an embracing continental
shelf, they did not envisage as being included within their remarks
a submarine cordillera or trench bottoming on the ocean floor. In
no way could the Nansen Cordillera (especially, the Greenland
Basin), which at its most narrow point (the Yermak Plateau
and Nordostrundingen) is 120 miles wide and at its most wide
point Mackenzie Cone in the Beaufort Sea and Svataya Anna
Cone off Franz Josef Land) is 1750 miles wide be considered
either a "deep channel immediately off the Coast" or a "part of
the continental shelf," nor could the opposing sides (shelves) of
Greenland and Spitzbergen be termed "areas of the [same]
continental shelf separated from it by channels deeper than 200
metres." Having determined that the above remarks are not
applicable to the particular problem, a resort to the Convention on
the Continental Shelf is necessary.
As article 1 in its duality defines the continental shelf to be
the "[s]eabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the territorial sea . . . to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas," it is not beyond the realm of reason or
the present law to contemplate the respective shelves of Greenland and Spitzbergen to include parts of the ocean floor of the
Greenland Basin and the Nansen Fracture Zone. Therefore,
while there would be precedent for Norway's "jumping" a channel
or a trough (as was done in the case of the Norwegian Trough
and the Santa Barbara Channel), there is no justification in
the case of the Nansen Fracture Zone.
Turning once again to article 6(1) for guidance, and to
the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the boundary should most opportunely be determined by agreement between the parties. Failing
this, and the lack of recognized "special circumstances," the
boundary is to be the median line. In the absence of any agreement by the parties, it may be concluded that the boundary
between the Greenland and Spitzbergen continental shelves is
the median line between the two lands. This median line,
drawn on equidistance principles, happens to fall quite generally along the continental slope of the Greenland shelf, and Nor-

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

47

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 [], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAw JOURNAL

Vol. 4

way's partage encompasses practically the entire Greenland Basin
and Nansen Fracture Zone.
In light of the above, an agreement could perforce be reached
between Denmark and Norway, which, if the Greenland Basin is
to be included as part of the respective shelves, would arrive at
some more equitable partage of that portion of the ocean floor.
Geomorphologically speaking, if advancing technology precludes the possibility of confining the continental shelf to be the
most seaward extent of the rise and slope of the continental
shelf, the stress laid by the Court in its Judgment on natural
prolongation should result in the Nansen Fracture Zone itself
becoming the demarcation line between the continental "shelves"
of Spitzbergen and Greenland. As the Fracture zone (if the continental drift theory is entitled to credence) is the original and
ultimate extent of the continental plates (although by envisaging
it as an "extent" means one is, geomorphologically, reasoning
backwards), there is no more natural or logical "shelf" or plate
demarcation line than this fracture zone. This, however, predicates upon a "prevision so extravagant," at least from an international legal point of view, that only scant reliance should be
placed on this otherwise valid principle by its proponents; and
in the vacuum of non-agreement by the parties, the only impartial and equitable determination of the boundary of the respective
shelves of Greenland and Spitzbergen can be a median line.
The delimitation between Spitzbergen and Russia (viz., her
territories Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land) is, generally
speaking, tabula rasa. There is no geosyncline, nor is there a
submarine cordillera or fracture zone to demarcate the continental shelf between Spitzbergen and both Franz Josef Land and
Novaya Zemlya. The eastern portion of the Barents Sea is
generally between 300 and 400 meters deep with irregular isobaths and certain prominent plateaus, e.g., that between Spitzbergen and Franz Josef Land, lying between 78' 00'.00" N and 80'
00' .00"N. As the natural prolongation and unity of deposit criteria prove of little value, and as the distance between Kritoya and
Ostrov Viktoria (the closest opposing islands of Spitzbergen and
Franz Josef Land) is less than 40 miles, the sole remaining
equitable method of demarcation is that of a lateral median line
which can be taken to be the demarcation between the respective territories.
One final point in conjunction with the delimitation between
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss1/5
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Spitzbergen, Franz Josef Land, and Novaya Zemlya; on all

Russian charts of the region, there appears a purple hatched line
representing the so-called Russian "Arctic Sector claim" on the
western extremity of the Russian sphere. The only other State
to make sector claims was Canada, who first developed the
09

theory. 1

109. Briefly stated, the "sector principle" on which the claims are based is
that all lands discovered or undiscovered, within a spherical triangle formed by
the North Pole and the easterly and westerly limits of a country's Arctic Ocean
coast, belong to the coastal State concerned or that this State should have at
least a preferential right to acquisition.
The Soviet sector claim, apparently inspired by the Canadian claim, was put
forward in 1926. It asserts Soviet sovereignty over all lands and islands
dis°
covered or to be discovered in the sector from L32' 04'35" E to L168 49'30"
W, except that acknowledged to be foreign territory (Spitzbergen). In writing
on the decree of 1926, Soviet jurists have gone beyond a mere claim to land,
claiming as "open polar seas" (that is, seas having a status "nearly identical
with that of territorial waters") all water areas within the Soviet sector. In
the opinion of the Soviet jurists, this gives the U.S.S.R. exclusive right to the airspace above such seas. Whether the writings of these jurists should be viewed
as private opinions or as quasi-official statements of Soviet policy is uncertain.
Consequently, what the Soviets actually include in the claim for their sector is
not known. In the late 1920's Norway protested the Soviet sector claim because
it negated the Norwegian claim to Franz Josef Land. The protest was not advanced vigorously, however, and it is now clear that Norway's claim to Franz
Josef Land has been abandoned.
The United States and Norway have not made Arctic sector claims and
do not recognize such claims or the sector principle. However, the United
States has never formally protested the sector claims, either those of Russia or
of Canada. However, it is noteworthy that Russia did not protest on any of
the several occasions in the 1950's when United States' manned ice-floe stations
circled into the Soviet sector.
While the author can find no basis in international law for such claims,
he merely mentions the existence of such a claim for the sake of completeness.
In any case, he does not believe that the existence of the claim in any way
can effect the validity of a lateral median line demarcation between the Russian
and the Spitzbergen continental shelves.
However, a median line between the Archipelago and Norway produces
even more inequitable results: the Norwegian continental shelf would artificially be truncated, would not reach the natural edge of the Barents Trough, and
would defeat even the natural prolongation principle stressed by the Court.
Casting for a possible equitable alternative to which Norway might be receptive although it would in itself be somewhat removed from the natural prolongation principle, a lateral median line between Spitzbergen and Norway which
for the purposes of construction ignores the quite accidental geological presence
of Bear Island, stranded between Spitzbergen and Norway, yields interesting resuits. Such a median line, while inherently attractive in that equidistance principles, somewhat more equitably arrived at, are employed, allots to Norway but
a relatively insignificant section of the Spitzbergen Banks.
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LORD ASQUITH OF BISHOPSTONE IN THE MATTER

OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT.
(TRUCIAL COAST)

LTD. AND THE SHEIKH OF ABU DHABI:

AN ANSWER TO THE SPITZBERGEN PROBLEM

In an articulate and extremely well-reasoned arbital award,
Lord Asquith resolved the question which is quite similar to the
ultimate query of this paper: whether United States' nationals
under the 1920 Treaty on the Status of Spitzbergen enjoy mineral
rights to oil and natural gas deposits located under the continental shelf of Spitzbergen. Lord Asquith's award is probably the
only international judicial pronouncement on the issue which
has attempted to answer the issues raised in this article. While
Lord Radcliffe's award in the Qatar Arbitration did precede that
of Lord Asquith's, it is of marginal use because Lord Radcliffe failed to expound the principles and reasoning on which
he based his conclusions.
Briefly stated, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut,
granted an exclusive concession to Petroleum Development
(Trucial Coast) Ltd. in 1939 to drill for and win mineral oil "in
the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler of
Abu Dhabi and its dependencies and all the islands and the sea
waters which belong to that area."' n
In 1949, and subsequent
to the continental shelf proclamation of Abu Dhabi, the Sheikh
granted a further concession to a company other than Petroleum
Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd., the plaintiffs, to drill for and
to win mineral oil on the continental shelf of Abu Dhabi beyond
the territorial sea. The plaintiffs claimed that under the concession such rights already vested in them due to the Continental
Shelf Doctrine. Lord Asquith held that they did not.
Lord Asquith initially "brushed aside" the "complicating
factors" of the doctrine of the Continental Shelf and negotiations (travaux prtparatoires), and considered the "bare langguage of the Agreement itself.""' The critical articles in issue
were articles 2 and 312
110. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu
Dhabi (United Kingdom v. Abu Dhabi) 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247, 249 (1952).
111. Id., at 252.

112. Article 2(a)

The area included in this Agreement is the whole

of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its
dependencies and all the islands and the sea waters which belong to
that area. And if in the future the lands which belong to Abu
Dhabi are defined by agreement with other States, then the limits of
the area shall coincide with the limits specified in this definition.
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It is readily apparent that the language employed in the
Agreement is clearer and less troublesome than in the 1920
Treaty. It mentions the right to "search for discover drill for
and produce mineral oils and their derivatives and allied substances." However, the same problem of areal definition occurs
in the Agreement, as in the Treaty, and in remarkably similar
form. Article 1 of the Treaty establishes the area in which the
Treaty would be effective, and article 2 in the Agreement does
the same. Article 3, in both instruments, in providing for the
mineral rights accorded the Parties, refers respectively to "the
territories specified in Article 1" and "within the area," the
"area" in the latter instance being that of article 2. Whereas
article 2 of the Agreement mentions "the whole of the lands
belong to the rule of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies and all the islands and the sea waters which belong to that
area," and article 1 of the Treaty fails to mention "sea waters,"
the omission is overcome by the inclusion of the dual prepositional
phrases "both on land and in the territorial waters" in article 3 of
the Treaty. Both instruments are "balanced" in this regard.
Lord Asquith makes a penetrating observation in his examination of the first coordinating conjunction "and" in the predicate nominative "the whole territory subject to the rule of the
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies and all its islands
and territorial waters." (article 2(a) ).13
(b) If in the future a Neutral Area should be established adjacent to
the lands of Abu Dhabi and the rights of rule over such Neutral Area
be shared between the Rule of Abu Dhabi and another Ruler, then the
Ruler of Abu Dhabi undertakes that this Agreement shall include what
mineral oil rights he has in that area.
(c) The Company shall not undertake any works in areas used and set
apart for places of worship or sacred building or burial grounds.
Article 3. The Ruler by this Agreement grants to the Company the
sole rights, for a period of 75 solar years from the date of signature, to
search for, discover, drill for, and produce mineral oils and their derivatives and allied substances within the area, and the sole right to the
ownership of all substances produced, and free disposal thereof both inside and outside the territory: provided that the export of oil shall be
from the territory of the Concession direct without passing across any
adjacent territory.
And it is understood that this Agreement is a grant of rights over Oil
and cannot be considered an Occupation in any manner whatsoever.
Id., at 249.
113. What does the word "and" mean in this connection? In its most
natural sense it surely means "plus." It introduces an addendum to
something which has gone before. (I discuss an alternative meaning
suggested for it below). But if it simply means "plus," then the expression 'the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler' cannot be read literally; for read literally that phrase would include in any
case the islands, and probably the territorial waters, and it would not
be necessary or sensible to make these items addenda.
On this
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Applying this to the pertinent parts of the language of article 1 of the Treaty of 1920, viz:
[T]he Archipelago of Spitzbergen, comprising, with Bear
Island or Beeren Island, all the islands situated between 10'
and 350 longitude East of Greenwich and between 740 and

810 latitude North, especially West Spitzbergen, North-East
Land, Barents Island, Ege Island, Wiche Islands, Hope Island
or Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Foreland, together
with all islands great or small and rocks appertaining
thereto...
and treating the words "together with" as did Lord Asquith
with "and," Lord Asquith's logic is in the Treaty context equally
applicable. The last phrase of article 1 of the Treaty indicates
clearly that all the lands of the Treaty (certainly with regard to
continental shelf lands) were not included in "the Archipelago
of Spitzbergen," for if such had been the case, the last phrase in
114
article 1 would be superfluous.
Applying this to article 1 of the Treaty of Spitzbergen, the
meaning of 'and,' the 'land' must be limited to the mainland (no doubt
excluding inland or landlocked waters in an incented coast). What, on
this basis, does the second addendum mean, viz., 'the sea waters which
belong to that area?' Placing oneself in the year 1939 and banishing
from one's mind the subsequent emergence of the doctrine of the
'Shelf' and everything to do with the negotiations, I should have
thought this expression could only have been intended to mean the territorial maritime belt in the Persian Gulf, which is a three-mile belt;
together with its bed and subsoil, since oil is not won from salt water.
In what other sense at that time could sea waters be said to 'belong' to
a littoral power or to the 'rule of the Ruler?' In point of fact, that is
the meaning the claimant company was asserting for the expression as
late as March, 1949, ten whole years after the contract (see letter page
86A of the Correspondence).
Even if 'and' had a different signification, not cumulative but epexegetic, such as 'and mark you, in case you are in doubt, I include in the
'lands' the islands and sea waters which belong to the area,' I should
still hold, in the absence of what I have termed the complicating factors, that the Concession covered the sea-bed and subsoil of the territorial belt. Nothing less. The only question would be whether it covered more [emphasis added].
Id., at 252.
114. In this regard, Hackworth states:
All words of the treaty are, if reasonably possible, to be given a meaning, and rules of construction may not be resorted to in order to render them meaningless.
5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 106 (1943).
In an instruction of August 1, 1929, from the Department to the Legation
in Bulgaria, the Department said:
It is certainly a rule in construing treaties, as well as all laws, to give
a sensible meaning to all their provisions if that be practicable. Treaty
stipulations will not be regarded as a nullity unless the language clearly
makes them so. It will not be presumed that the framers of a treaty
have done a vain thing.
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only entirely logical and coherent interpretation of the article is
in a manner consistent with Lord Asquith's observations. The
interpretation is what should by now be obvious: the High Contracting Parties did not intend to reserve to themselves mineral
rights in submerged lands beyond the four mile territorial sea of
Spitzbergen.
Before examining further Lord Asquith's views on the inclusion vel non of the continental shelf in the 1939 concession, the
1920 Treaty concerning Spitzbergen should be interpreted in a
1920 context in an attempt to reconstruct what was the intention
of the parties at that time. Although there are doubtless
those of other persuasions who believe that a Treaty should be
treated as a "living instrument," and that its meaning should
change with the times, this author believes that an instrument
conceived for a specific purpose and not generally philosophical
in nature should, where its language evinces uncertainty, be reconstructed with due regard for the intent of the parties.1 15
In addressing himself to the problem raised by the continental shelf, Lord Asquith found that not only was the concept of
the continental shelf not an established rule of international law
at the time of his award (1951), but that it was clearly inapplicable and incapable of affecting the construction of the contract
of 1939. In response to the attempt by the plaintiffs to enlarge
the meaning of "lands" in "the whole of the lands which belong
to the rule of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi" or in "the sea waters
which belong to that area" in article 2(a), he states:
The argument falls to the ground if I am right in rejecting
115. Lord Asquith is apparently of the same view when he writes:
[A]lthough it is clear that marine areas were at this stage quite
outside the contemplation of the parties ...
1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 247, 259 (1952).
Negatively (still leaving aside what I have called the complicating factors) I should certainly in 1939 have read the expression 'the sea waters which belong to that area' not only as including, but as limited
to, the territorial belt and its sub-soil. At that time neither contracting
party had ever heard of the doctrine of the Continental Shelf, which as
a legal doctrine did not then exist. No thought of it entered their
heads. None such entered that of the most sophisticated jurisconsult,
let alone the 'understanding' perhaps strong, but 'simple and unschooled', of Trucial Sheikhs.
Directed, as I apprehend I am, to apply a simple and broad jurispru-

dence to the construction of this contract, it seems to me that it would
be a most artificial refinement to read back into the contract the implications of a doctrine not mooted till seven years later, and, if the view

which I am about to express is sound, not even admitted to the canon
of international law.
Id., at 253.
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the premise on which it rests, namely, that the doctrine of
the Shelf has become and, indeed, was already in 1939, part

of the corpus of international law." 6
In conclusion, he states:
[I]t follows, if I am right, that the claimants succeed as to
the subsoil of the territorial waters (including the territorial

waters of islands) and that the Sheikh succeeds as to the
subsoil of the shelf; by which I mean in this connection the
submarine area contiguous with Abu Dhabi outside the territorial zone; viz., the former is included in the Concession
117
and the latter is not; and I award and declare to that effect.
Before leaving Abu Dhabi, an excerpt from an editorial
comment on Lord Asquith's award by Richard Young points to a
fact which should have occurred to the reader and to the original
High Contracting Parties:
The crux of the matter in this regard was that the words
used in the 1939 agreement, as those words were commonly
understood at the time, were not apt to convey any interest
in submarine areas outside of territorial waters. Had such
language been used, it would presumably have been binding
on the parties in the arbitration proceeding, regardless of
the existence or nonexistence in international law of a rule
118
with respect to the continental shelf.
Although Lord Radcliffe, in Petroleum Development (Qatar)
Ltd. v. Ruler of Qatar1 9 did not, as earlier indicated, include the
reasons for his ruling in his award, his decision based on a similar
set of facts as in Abu Dhabi is pertinent. The First Article of the
Oil Agreement with the plaintiffs provided for "the sole right
throughout the Principality of Qatar to explore, to prospect, to
drill for and to extract and to ship and to export, and the right
to refine and sell petroleum and natural gases, ozokerite, asphalt
and everything which is extracted therefrom."' 12 0 The Second Article provided, inter alia, that the Company could "operate in any
part of the State of Qatar. .

.

. The State of Qatar means the

whole area over which the Sheikh rules. ... "I"
Lord Radcliffe, as the Third Arbitrator, held:
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id., at 260.
Id.
46 AM. J. INT'L L. 512, 514 (1952).
18 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 161 (1957).
Id.
Id.
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(e) The Third Arbitrator and the Sheikh's Arbitrator decide that the Concession does not include the sea-bed or subsoil or any part thereof beneath the high seas of the Persian
Gulf contiguous with such territorial waters, which sea-bed
and subsoil are more particularly mentioned in the1 22aforesaid
Proclamation of 8th June, 1949, and they so award.
The rationes decidendi of Lords Asquith and Radcliffe leave
us with but one result: that under article 3 of the Treaty the
United States and the other High Contracting Parties to the Treaty
on the Status of Spitzbergen of 9 February, 1920 have never
enjoyed rights to oil and natural gas deposits in the continental
shelf of Spitzbergen.
VIII.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

The conclusions reached in this article are not the only ones
which can be drawn from the matrix of fact and circumstance which Secretary of State Lansing called "A Unique International Problem" as early as 1917. The conclusions are at least
substantiated by the mining history prior to the Treaty on the
Status of Spitzbergen, subsequent practices attendant to it, and by
the decisions of the International Court of Justice.
While it is true that the future may reveal that Spitzbergen
Banks contain great unexploited reserves of oil, at the moment
few American corporations are actively engaged in petroleum
exploration in this area. There are other interests relating to
United States-foreign relations, defense, and strategic geographical locations which may prove to be far more important than
the ability to acquire oil and natural gas more cheaply than the
historic and geographic equities would dictate.
Hopefully, the identification of issues in this article will
prove of some value and that the author has succeeded in making Secretary Lansing's unique international problem perhaps a
bit less so.

122. Id., at 163.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

55

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 [], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAw JOURNAL

Vol. 4

APPENDIX:
TREATY CONCERNING THE ARCHIPELAGO
OF SPITZBERGENt
Article 1.
The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognise, sub-

ject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute
sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, comprising, with Bear Island or Beeren-Eiland, all the islands situated between 100 and 350 longitude East of Greenwich and
between 74' and 810 latitude North, especially West Spitsbergen,
North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiche Islands,
Hope Island or Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Foreland,
together with all islands great or small and rocks appertaining
thereto.
Article 2.
Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties
shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters.
Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable
measures to ensure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters; it being clearly understood that these measures
shall always be applicable equally to the nationals of all the High
Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour
whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage of any one of
them.
Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognized in
accordance with the terms of Articles 6 and 7 will enjoy the exclusive right of hunting on their own land: (1) in the neighbourhood of their habitations, houses, stores, factories and installations,
constructed for the purpose of developing their property, under
conditions laid down by the local police regulations; (2) within
t Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892, T.S. 686, 2 L.N.T.S. 8. Signatories included Norway, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa,

United Kingdom, Canada, India, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Sweden.

There are three accepted spellings for the name of the Archipelago:
bard, Spitsbergen, and Spitzbergen.
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a radius of 10 kilometres round the head-quarters of their place
of business or works; and in both cases, subject always to the
observance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government in
accordance with the conditions laid down in the present Article.
Article 3.
The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have
equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in
Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing
of absolute equality.
They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining
or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial
waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account or
for any entreprise whatever.
Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which
may be in force in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1
shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward
or homeward voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or coming from the said
territories, or for any other purpose.
It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard
to exports, imports and transit traffic, the nationals of all the
High Contracting Parties, their ships and goods shall not be
subject to any charges or restrictions whatever which are not
borne by the nationals, ships or goods which enjoy in Norway
the treatment of the most favoured nation; Norwegian nationals,
ships or goods being for this purpose assimilated to those of the
other High Contracting Parties, and not treated more favourably in any respect.
No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the exportation
of any goods to the territories of any of the Contracting Powers other or more onerous than on the exportation of similar
goods to the territory of any other Contracting Power (including
Norway) or to any other destination.
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Article 4.
All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be
established by or with the authorisation of, the Norwegian Government within the territories referred to in Article 1 shall always
be open on a footing of absolute equality to communications
from ships of all flags and from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down in the Wireless
Telegraphy Convention of July 5th, 1912, or in the subsequent
International Convention which may be concluded to replace it.
Subject to international obligations arising out of a state of
war, owners of landed property shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless telegraphy installations, which shall be free to communicate on private business
with fixed or moving wireless stations, including those on board
ships and aircraft.
Article 5.
The High Contracting Parties recognise the utility of establishing an international meteorological station in the territories
specified in Article 1, the organisation of which shall form the
subject of a subsequent Convention.
Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific investigations may be conducted in
the said territories.
Article 6.
Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired
rights of nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall be
recognised.
Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation
of land before the signature of the present Treaty shall be dealt
with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have the
same force and effect as the present Treaty.
Article 7.
With regard to methods of acquistion, enjoyment and exercise of the right of ownership of property, including mineral
rights, in the territories specified in Article 1, Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals of the High Contracting Parties
treatment based on complete equality and in conformity with the
stipulations of the present Treaty.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss1/5
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Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public
utility and on payment of proper compensation.
Article 8.
Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified
in Article 1 mining regulations which, especially from the point
of view of imposts, taxes or charges of any kind, and of general
or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit of the State or of the nationals
of any one of the High Contracting Parties, including Norway,
and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and protection necessary for their physical, moral and intellectual welfare.
Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to
the said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the
object in view.
So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian Government shall have the right to levy
an export duty which shall not exceed 1% of the maximum value
of the minerals exported up to 100,000 tons, and beyond that
quantity the duty will be proportionately diminished. The value
shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season by calculating
the average free on board price obtained.
Three months before the date fixed for their coming into
force, the draft mining regulations shall be communicated by the
Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers. If
during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to
modify these regulations before they are applied, such proposals
shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the
other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted
to examination and the decision of a Commission composed of
one representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission
shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and
shall come to a decision within a period of three months from the
date of its first meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority.
Article 9.
Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission
of Norway to the League of Nations, Norway undertakes not to
create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the
territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortificaPublished by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

59

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 [], Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

don in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike
purposes.
Article 10.
Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a
Russian Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the
same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties.
Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they
may have to put forward shall be presented under the conditions
laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6 and Annex)
through the intermediary of the Danish Government, who declare
their willingness to lend their good offices for this purpose.
The PRESENT TREATY, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified.
Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as possible.
Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside
Europe may confine their action to informing the Government of
the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative at
Paris, that their ratification has been given, and in this case they
shall transmit the instrument as soon as possible.
The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the
stipulations of Article 8 are concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other respects on the
same date as the mining regulations provided for in that Article.
Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the
French Republic to adhere to the present Treaty duly ratified.
This adhesion shall be effected by a communication addressed to
the French Government, which will undertake to notify the other
Contracting Parties.
In witness whereof the above named Plenipotentiairies [sic]
have signed the present Treaty.
Done at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to the Government of His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of
the French Republic; authenticated copies will be transmitted to
the other Signatory Powers.
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